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Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
A number of American police departments have been experimenting with new 
problem-oriented policing frameworks to prevent gang and group-involved violence 
generally known as the “pulling levers” focused deterrence strategies.  Focused 
deterrence strategies honor core deterrence ideas, such as increasing risks faced by 
offenders, while finding new and creative ways of deploying traditional and non-
traditional law enforcement tools to do so, such as directly communicating 
incentives and disincentives to targeted offenders.  Pioneered in Boston to halt 
serious gang violence, the focused deterrence framework has been applied in many 
American cities through federally sponsored violence prevention programs. In its 
simplest form, the approach consists of selecting a particular crime problem, such as 
gang homicide; convening an interagency working group of law enforcement, social-
service, and community-based practitioners; conducting research to identify key 
offenders, groups, and behavior patterns; framing a response to offenders and 
groups of offenders that uses a varied menu of sanctions (“pulling levers”) to stop 
them from continuing their violent behavior; focusing social services and 
community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement 
prevention efforts; and directly and repeatedly communicating with offenders to 
make them understand why they are receiving this special attention.  These new 
strategic approaches have been applied to a range of crime problems, such as overt 
drug markets and individual repeat offenders, and have shown promising results in 
the reduction of crime. 
OBJECTIVES 
To synthesize the extant evaluation literature and assess the effects of pulling levers 
focused deterrence strategies on crime. 
SELECTION CRITERIA 
Eligible studies had to meet three criteria: (1) the program had to have the core 
elements of a pulling levers focused deterrence strategy present; (2) a comparison 
group was included; (3) at least one crime outcome was reported. The units of 
analysis had to be people or places. 
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SEARCH STRATEGY 
Several strategies were used to perform an exhaustive search for literature fitting the 
eligibility criteria. First, a keyword search was performed on an array of online 
abstract databases.  Second, we reviewed the bibliographies of past narrative and 
empirical reviews of literature that examined the effectiveness of pulling levers 
focused deterrence programs. Third, we performed forward searches for works that 
have cited seminal focused deterrence studies.  Fourth, we searched bibliographies 
of narrative reviews of police crime prevention efforts and past completed Campbell 
systematic reviews of police crime prevention efforts.  Fifth, we performed hand 
searches of leading journals in the field. 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
For our ten eligible studies, we complete a narrative review of effectiveness and a 
formal meta-analysis of the main effects of these programs on reported crime 
outcomes.  
MAIN RESULTS 
Based on our narrative review, we find that nine of the ten eligible evaluations 
reported statistically significant reductions in crime. It is important to note here that 
all ten evaluations used nonrandomized quasi-experimental designs.  No 
randomized controlled trials were identified by our search strategies.  Our meta-
analysis suggests that pulling levers focused deterrence strategies are associated 
with an overall statistically-significant, medium-sized crime reduction effect. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We conclude that pulling levers focused deterrence strategies seem to be effective in 
reducing crime. However, we urge caution in interpreting these results because of 
the lack of more rigorous randomized controlled trials in the existing body of 
scientific evidence on this approach. 
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1 Background 
Deterrence theory posits that crimes can be prevented when the costs of committing 
the crime are perceived by the offender to outweigh the benefits (Gibbs, 1975; 
Zimring and Hawkins, 1973).  Most discussions of the deterrence mechanism 
distinguish between “general” and “special” deterrence (Cook, 1980).  General 
deterrence is the idea that the general population is dissuaded from committing 
crime when it sees that punishment necessarily follows the commission of a crime.  
Special deterrence involves punishment administered to criminals with the intent to 
discourage them from committing crimes in the future.  Much of the literature 
evaluating deterrence focuses on the effect of changing certainty, swiftness, and 
severity of punishment associated with certain acts on the prevalence of those 
crimes (see, e.g. Apel and Nagin, 2011; Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin, 1978; Cook, 
1980; Nagin, 1998; Paternoster, 1987).   
In recent years scholars have begun to argue that police interventions provide an 
effective approach for gaining both special and general deterrence against crime.  A 
series of experimental and quasi-experimental studies have shown that the police 
can be effective in preventing crime (Braga, 2001, 2005; Skogan and Frydl, 2004; 
Weisburd and Eck, 2004), and that such crime prevention benefits are not offset by 
displacement of crime to areas near to police interventions (Braga, 2001; Weisburd 
et al., 2006).  Durlauf and Nagin have drawn from this literature to argue that 
“increasing the visibility of the police by hiring more officers and by allocating 
existing officers in ways that heighten the perceived risk of apprehension 
consistently seem to have substantial marginal deterrent effects” (2011: 14).  Indeed, 
they conclude that crime prevention in the U.S. would be improved by “shifting 
resources from imprisonment to policing” (2011: 9-10).              
A recent innovation in policing that capitalizes on the growing evidence of the 
effectiveness of police deterrence strategies is the “focused deterrence” framework, 
often referred to as “pulling-levers policing” (Kennedy, 1997, 2008).   Pioneered in 
Boston as a problem-oriented policing project to halt serious gang violence during 
the 1990s (Kennedy, Peel, and Braga, 1996), the focused deterrence framework has 
been applied in many U.S. cities through federally sponsored violence prevention 
programs such as the Strategic Alternatives to Community Safety Initiative and 
Project Safe Neighborhoods (Dalton, 2002).  Focused deterrence strategies honor 
core deterrence ideas, such as increasing risks faced by offenders, while finding new 
and creative ways of deploying traditional and non-traditional law enforcement tools 
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to do so, such as directly communicating incentives and disincentives to targeted 
offenders (Kennedy, 1997, 2008).  
In its simplest form, the approach consists of selecting a particular crime problem, 
such as youth homicide; convening an interagency working group of law 
enforcement, social-service, and community-based practitioners; conducting 
research to identify key offenders, groups, and behavior patterns; framing a 
response to offenders and groups of offenders that uses a varied menu of sanctions 
(“pulling levers”) to stop them from continuing their violent behavior; focusing 
social services and community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match 
law enforcement prevention efforts; and directly and repeatedly communicating 
with offenders to make them understand why they are receiving this special 
attention (Kennedy, 1997, 2006).  The focused deterrence approach is also 
consistent with recent theorizing about police innovation, which suggests that 
approaches that seek to both create more focus in application of crime prevention 
programs and that expand the tools of policing are likely to be most successful 
(Weisburd and Eck, 2004). 
In the United States, without the support of a formal evaluation, Boston’s Operation 
Ceasefire pulling levers strategy was hailed as an unprecedented success (see, e.g. 
Butterfield, 1996; Witkin, 1997).  These claims followed a surprising large decrease 
in youth homicide after the strategy was fully implemented in mid May 1996.  
However, more rigorous examinations of youth homicide in Boston soon followed.  
A U.S. Department of Justice-sponsored quasi-experimental evaluation of Operation 
Ceasefire that the intervention was associated with a 63% decrease in monthly 
number of Boston youth homicides (Braga et al., 2001). Other examinations of 
violence trends in Boston, however, were more skeptical of the violence prevention 
value of Boston’s approach (see, e.g., Fagan, 2002; Rosenfeld et al., 2005).  
Since the publication of the Boston Ceasefire evaluation, several evaluations of 
similar focused deterrence strategies implemented in other U.S. cities, such as 
Chicago (Papachristos et al., 2007), Los Angeles (Tita et al., 2003), and Indianapolis 
(McGarrell et al., 2006), have been published.  These evaluations reported similar 
noteworthy crime reduction effects associated with the focused deterrence approach.  
The basic principles of the focused deterrence approach have also been applied to 
overt drug market problems (Kennedy, 2009) and repeat offending by substance-
abusing probationers (Hawken and Kleiman (2009) with positive crime prevention 
gains reported. 
Given the growing popularity of pulling levers focused deterrence strategies in the 
United States, as well as the conflicting views on its crime prevention value, a 
systematic review of the empirical evidence on the effects of focused deterrence 
interventions on crime is necessary to assess the value of this approach to crime 
prevention. 
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2 Objectives 
The objective of this review is to synthesize the existing published and non-
published empirical evidence on the effects of pulling levers focused deterrence 
strategies on crime and to provide a systematic assessment of the preventive value of 
this approach.  Often, these new approaches represent a specific application of 
deterrence strategies within a problem-oriented policing framework (Kennedy, 
2006; Braga, 2008a; see also Goldstein, 1990; Eck and Spelman, 1987).  In short, 
many focused deterrence strategies use the iterative problem-oriented policing 
process (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment) to frame an interagency 
response to deter groups of chronic offenders from continuing their ongoing violent 
conflicts.  More recently, however, these strategic applications of focused deterrence 
principles have been applied to a wider range of problems such as overt drug 
markets (Kennedy, 2009).  This review will include this wider range of focused 
deterrence strategies. 
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3  Methods 
 
3.1  INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
3.1.1 Types of Studies 
Only studies that used comparison group designs involving before and after 
measures were eligible for the main analyses of this review.  In several well-known 
pulling levers focused deterrence evaluations (e.g. Braga et al., 2001; McGarrell et 
al., 2006), the comparison group experienced routine modern police responses to 
crime that includes a blend of traditional police responses (e.g., random patrol, 
rapid response, and ad-hoc investigations) and opportunistic community problem-
oriented responses.  While strategic interventions developed from community and 
problem-oriented policing initiatives may be present in certain control areas, none 
of the comparisons implemented focused deterrence strategies to address crime 
problems.  The comparison group study had to be either experimental or quasi-
experimental (nonrandomized) (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Cook and Campbell, 
1979). 
3.1.2 Types of Units of Analysis 
Pulling levers strategies attempt to influence the criminal behavior of individuals 
through the strategic application of enforcement and social service resources to 
facilitate desirable behaviors.  However, existing reviews of the crime prevention 
value of pulling levers strategies have noted that published evaluations only report 
aggregated measures of underlying levels of criminal behaviors in targeted areas 
(Wellford et al., 2005).  For example, in Boston, the pulling levers intervention 
targeted violent behavior among gang-involved offenders. The evaluators measured 
behavioral change among gang-involved offenders by examining city-wide trends in 
aggregated measures of serious violence (Braga et al., 2001).   
3.1.3 Types of Interventions 
To be eligible for this review, interventions had to be identified as a focused 
deterrence strategy.  As described by Kennedy (2006: 156-157), pulling levers 
operations have tended to follow this basic framework: 
• Selection of a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide or street 
drug dealing. 
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• Pulling together an interagency enforcement group, typically including 
police, probation, parole, state and federal prosecutors, and sometimes 
federal enforcement agencies. 
• Conducting research, usually relying heavily on the field experience of front-
line police officers, to identify key offenders – and frequently groups of 
offenders, such as street gangs, drug crews, and the like – and the context of 
their behavior. 
• Framing a special enforcement operation directed at those offenders and 
groups of offenders, and designed to substantially influence that context, for 
example by using any and all legal tools (or levers) to sanction groups such as 
crack crews whose members commit serious violence. 
• Matching those enforcement operations with parallel efforts to direct 
services and the moral voices of affected communities to those same 
offenders and groups. 
• Communicating directly and repeatedly with offenders and groups to let 
them know that they are under particular scrutiny, what acts (such as 
shootings) will get special attention, when that has in fact happened to 
particular offenders and groups, and what they can do to avoid enforcement 
action.  One form of this communication is the “forum,” “notification,” or 
“call-in,” in which offenders are invited or directed (usually because they are 
on probation or parole) to attend face-to-face meetings with law enforcement 
officials, service providers, and community figures. 
We used this basic framework to assist in our determination whether particular 
programs engaged the focused deterrence approach.  It is important to note here, 
however, that certain programs that were determined to be eligible for this review 
did not necessarily follow the very specific pulling levers steps identified by Kennedy 
(2006). Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies are often framed as problem-
oriented exercises where specific recurring crime problems are analyzed and 
responses are highly customized to local conditions and operational capacities.  As 
such, we fully anticipated a variety of pulling levers focused deterrence strategies to 
be identified by our systematic review. 
3.1.4 Types of Outcome Measures 
Eligible studies must measure the effects of the focused deterrence intervention on 
officially recorded levels of crime at places or crime by individuals.  Appropriate 
crime measures included crime incident reports, citizen emergency calls for service, 
and arrest data.  Particular attention was paid to studies that measured crime 
displacement effects and diffusion of crime control benefit effects.  For instance, 
Kennedy (2006) described a place-based application of pulling levers focused on a 
disorderly drug market operating in High Point, North Carolina. Crime prevention 
strategies focused on specific locations have been criticized as resulting in 
displacement (see Repetto, 1976).  More recently, academics have observed that 
crime prevention programs may result in the complete opposite of displacement—
that crime control benefits were greater than expected and “spill over” into places 
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beyond the target areas (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994).  The quality of the 
methodologies used to measure displacement and diffusion effects, as well as the 
types of displacement (spatial, temporal, target, modus operandi) examined, was 
also assessed. 
3.2  SEARCH STRATEGIES FOR IDENTIFICATION OF 
STUDIES 
Several strategies were used to perform an exhaustive search for literature fitting the 
eligibility criteria. First, a keyword search was performed on an array of online 
abstract databases (see lists of keywords and databases below). Second, we reviewed 
the bibliographies of past narrative and empirical reviews of literature that 
examined the effectiveness of pulling levers focused deterrence programs (Kennedy, 
2006, 2008; Wellford et al., 2005; Skogan and Frydl, 2004). Third, we performed 
forward searches for works that have cited seminal pulling levers focused deterrence 
studies (Kennedy et al., 1996; Kennedy, 1997; Braga et al., 2001; McGarrell et al., 
2006; Papachristos et al., 2007).  Fourth, we searched bibliographies of narrative 
reviews of police crime prevention efforts (Braga, 2008a; Braga, Kennedy, and Tita, 
2002; Sherman, 2002; Weisburd and Eck, 2004) and past completed Campbell 
systematic reviews of police crime prevention efforts (Braga, 2007; Mazerolle et al., 
2007; Weisburd et al., 2008).  Fifth, we performed hand searches of leading journals 
in the field.1
Our searches were all completed between May and September 2010.  Thus, our 
review only covers studies published in 2010 and earlier. Sixth, after finishing the 
above searches and reviewing the studies as described later, we e-mailed the list of 
studies meeting our eligibility criteria in September 2010 to leading criminology and 
criminal justice scholars knowledgeable in the area of pulling levers focused 
deterrence strategies. These 90 scholars were defined as those who authored at least 
one study which appeared on our inclusion list, anyone involved with the National 
Academy of Sciences reviews of police research (Skogan and Frydl, 2004) and 
firearms research (Wellford et al., 2005), and other leading scholars identified by 
the authors (see Appendix A). This helped us identify studies the above searches left 
out as these experts were able to refer us to studies we missed, particularly 
unpublished studies. Finally, we consulted with an information specialist at the 
outset of our review and at points along the way in order to ensure that we used 
 
 
1 These journals were: Criminology, Criminology & Public Policy, Justice Quarterly, Journal of 
Research in Crime and Delinquency, Journal of Criminal Justice, Police Quarterly, Policing, Police 
Practice and Research, British Journal of Criminology, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, Crime & 
Delinquency, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, and Policing and Society. Hand searches 
covered 1979-2009. 
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appropriate search strategies to identify the studies meeting the criteria of this 
review.2
The following fifteen databases were searched: 
  
Criminal Justice Periodical Index 
1. Sociological Abstracts 
2. Social Science Abstracts (SocialSciAbs) 
3. Social Science Citation Index 
4. Arts and Humanities Search (AHSearch) 
5. Criminal Justice Abstracts 
6. National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) Abstracts 
7. Educational Resources Information Clearinghouse (ERIC) 
8. Legal Resource Index 
9. Dissertation Abstracts 
10. Government Publications Office, Monthly Catalog (GPO Monthly) 
11. Google Scholar 
12. Online Computer Library Center (OCLC) SearchFirst 
13. CINCH data search 
14. C2 SPECTR (The Campbell Collaboration Social, Psychological, 
Educational and 
15. Criminological Trials Register) 
The following terms were used to search the fifteen databases listed above:  
1) Pulling levers AND police 
2) Problem-oriented policing 
3) Police AND repeat offenders 
4) Police AND gangs 
5) Police AND guns 
6) Gang violence prevention 
7) Focused deterrence 
8) Deterring violent offenders 
9) Strategic gang enforcement 
10) Crackdowns AND gangs 
11) Enforcement swamping 
12) Drug market intervention 
3.3  DETAILS OF STUDY CODING CATEGORIES 
All eligible studies were coded (see coding protocol attached in Appendix B) on a 
variety of criteria including: 
 
2 Ms. Phyllis Schultze of the Gottfredson Library at the Rutgers University School of Criminal Justice 
executed the initial abstract search and was consulted throughout on our search strategies. 
 14   The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
 
1. Reference information (title, authors, publication etc.) 
2. Nature of description of selection of site, problems etc. 
3. Nature and description of selection of comparison group or period 
4. The unit of analysis 
5. The sample size 
6. Methodological type (randomized experiment or quasi-experiment) 
7. A description of the pulling levers intervention 
8. Dosage intensity and type 
9. Implementation difficulties 
10. The statistical test(s) used 
11. Reports of statistical significance (if any) 
12. Effect size/power (if any) 
13. The conclusions drawn by the authors 
Two graduate research assistants from the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and 
Management at Harvard University independently coded each eligible study. Where 
there were discrepancies, Dr. Braga reviewed the study and determined the final 
coding decision.  
3.4  STATISTICAL PROCEDURES AND CONVENTIONS 
Analysis of outcome measures across studies were carried out in a uniform manner 
and, when appropriate and possible, involved quantitative analytical methods.  We 
used meta-analyses of program effects to determine the size and direction of the 
effects and weighting effect sizes based on the variance of the effect size and the 
study sample size (Lipsey and Wilson, 2001).  In this systematic review, we used the 
standardized mean difference effect size (also known as Cohen’s d; see Rosenthal, 
1994). We employed the Effect Size Calculator, developed by David B. Wilson and 
available on the Campbell Collaboration’s web site, to calculate standardized mean 
difference effect sizes for reported outcomes in each study. 3
3.4.1 Determination of Independent Findings 
  We then used Biostat’s 
Comprehensive Meta Analysis Version 2.2 to conduct the meta-analysis of effect 
sizes.  The specific approaches used to calculate effect sizes for each outcome in the 
eligible studies are described in the meta-analysis section. 
One problem in conducting meta-analyses in crime and justice is that investigators 
often did not prioritize outcomes examined. This is common in studies in the social 
sciences in which authors view good practice as demanding that all relevant 
outcomes be reported. For example, the Boston Operation Ceasefire evaluation 
presents an array of outcome measures including youth homicides, shots fired calls 
for service, gun assault incidents, and youth gun assault incidents in one high-risk 
district (Braga et al., 2001).  However, the lack of prioritization of outcomes in a 
study raises the question of how to derive an overall effect of treatment. For 
 
3 http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/resources/effect_size_input.php 
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example, the reporting of one significant result may reflect a type of “creaming” in 
which the authors focus on one significant finding and ignore the less positive 
results of other outcomes. But authors commonly view the presentation of multiple 
findings as a method for identifying the specific contexts in which the treatment is 
effective. When the number of such comparisons is small and therefore unlikely to 
affect the error rates for specific comparisons such an approach is often valid. 
We analyze the studies using three approaches. The first is conservative in the sense 
that it combines all reported outcomes reported into an overall average effect size 
statistic. The second represents the largest effect reported in the studies and gives an 
upper bound to our findings. It is important to note that in some of the studies with 
more than one outcome reported, the largest outcome reflected what authors 
thought would be the most direct program effect. This was true for the Boston 
Operation Ceasefire evaluation, which examined a wider range of serious gun 
violence outcome measures, but assumed that the largest program effects given the 
intervention would be found in the case of youth homicide incidents (Braga et al., 
2001). Finally, we present the smallest effect size for each study. This approach is 
the most conservative and likely underestimates the effect of pulling levers focused 
deterrence on crime. We use it here primarily to provide a lower bound to our 
findings. 
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4 Findings 
4.1  SELECTION OF STUDIES 
Search strategies in the systematic review process generate a large number of 
citations and abstracts for potentially relevant studies that must be closely screened 
to determine whether the studies meet the eligibility criteria (Farrington and 
Petrosino, 2001). The screening process yields a much smaller pool of eligible 
studies for inclusion in the review.  The four search strategies produced 2,473 
distinct abstracts.  The contents of these abstracts were reviewed for any suggestion 
of an evaluation of pulling levers interventions.  93 distinct abstracts were selected 
for closer review and the full-text reports, journal articles, and books for these 
abstracts were acquired and carefully assessed to determine whether the 
interventions involved pulling levers focused deterrence strategies and whether the 
studies used randomized controlled trial designs or nonrandomized quasi-
experimental designs.  Ten eligible studies were identified and included in this 
review:  
1. Operation Ceasefire in Boston, Massachusetts (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, 
and Piehl, 2001) 
2. Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership in Indianapolis, Indiana 
(McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson, and Corsaro, 2006)  
3. Operation Peacekeeper in Stockton, California (Braga, 2008b) 
4. Project Safe Neighborhoods in Lowell, Massachusetts (Braga, Pierce, 
McDevitt, Bond, and Cronin, 2008) 
5. Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence in Cincinnati, Ohio (Engel, 
Baker, Skubak Tillyer, Dunham, Hall, Ozer, Henson, and Godsey, 2009) 
6. Operation Ceasefire in Newark, New Jersey (Boyle, Lanterman, 
Pascarella, and Cheng, 2010) 
7. Operation Ceasefire in Los Angeles, California (Tita, Riley, Ridgeway, 
Grammich, Abrahamse, and Greenwood, 2003) 
8. Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, Illinois (Papachristos, Meares, 
and Fagan, 2007) 
9. Drug Market Intervention in Nashville, Tennessee (Corsaro and 
McGarrell, 2009) 
10. Drug Market Intervention in Rockford, Illinois (Corsaro, Brunson, and 
McGarrell, 2010) 
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4.2  CHARACTERISTICS OF ELIGIBLE STUDIES 
The ten selected studies examined pulling levers focused deterrence interventions 
that were implemented in small, medium, and large U.S. cities (Table 1).4  Three of 
the eligible evaluations (Cincinnati, Nashville, and Newark) were not published at 
the time the review of abstracts was completed.5
The two crime reduction strategies focused on individuals represented deviations 
from the classic pulling levers focused deterrence approach developed in Boston and 
defined by Kennedy (2006).  However, after a careful review of program elements, 
we determined that the necessary components of an eligible study were present.  As 
an additional check on our selections, we contacted academics associated with each 
of the two programs and reviewed our decisions with them.
  All ten included evaluations that 
were released after 2000 and seven were completed after 2007.  Six studies 
evaluated the crime reduction effects of pulling levers strategies on serious violence 
generated by street gangs or criminally-active street groups (Boston, Cincinnati, 
Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Lowell, and Stockton).  Two studies evaluated strategies 
focused on reducing crime driven by street-level drug markets (Nashville and 
Rockford) and are generally called “Drug Market Intervention” (DMI) pulling levers 
focused deterrence strategies. Two studies evaluated crime reduction strategies that 
were focused on individuals (Chicago and Newark). 
6
Boyle et al. (2010) described Newark’s “Operation Ceasefire” strategy as focused on 
preventing gun violence by criminally-active individuals that was a hybrid of the 
Boston Ceasefire pulling levers model (Kennedy et al., 1996) and the Chicago 
CeaseFire public health approach that uses trained street outreach staff, public 
education campaigns, and community mobilization to prevent shootings (Skogan et 
al., 2008).  The Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods study evaluated the violence 
reduction effects of a strategy comprised of four key interventions: (1) increased 
federal prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns, (2) lengthy 
sentences associated with federal prosecutions, (3) supply-side firearm policing 
  All concurred with our 
decision to include these programs in the review.  
 
4 During our search for eligible studies, several scholars suggested that the systematic review include 
the Hawaii Opportunity with Probation Enforcement randomized controlled trial (Hawken and 
Kleiman, 2009).  While this program represented a departure from our selection criteria, we agree that 
the deterrence mechanisms in HOPE are very similar to the mechanisms engaged by the ten pulling 
levers focused deterrence evaluations included in this report. We included HOPE in an earlier version 
of this review (Braga and Weisburd, 2012) and discuss the program and its implications for this review 
in Appendix E. 
5 During the development of this report, the Newark study was accepted for publication at Justice 
Research and Policy and the Nashville study was accepted for publication at Evaluation Review. 
6 For Newark’s Operation Ceasefire, we contacted Professor George Kelling of Rutgers University. 
Kelling led the research team that was primarily responsible for the development and implementation 
of the program evaluated by Boyle et al. (2010).  For Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods, we contacted 
Professor Andrew Papachristos of the University of Massachusetts, Professor Tracey Meares of Yale 
Law School, and Professor Jeffrey Fagan of Columbia University.  
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activities, and (4) social marketing of deterrence and social norms messages through 
offender notification meetings (Papachristos et al., 2007).   
All ten eligible studies used quasi-experimental designs to analyze the impact of 
pulling levers focused deterrence strategies on crime. Seven evaluations used quasi-
experimental designs with non-equivalent comparison groups (Boston, Cincinnati, 
Indianapolis, Lowell, Nashville, Rockford, and Stockton). Two evaluations used 
quasi-experimental designs with comparison groups created through matching 
techniques (Chicago and Newark).  One evaluation used a quasi-experimental design 
that included both non-equivalent comparison groups and comparison groups 
created through matching techniques (Los Angeles).  Table 2 provides a brief 
summary of the treatment, units of analysis, and research design used by the ten 
eligible studies. 
Five studies evaluated the crime reduction effects of focused deterrence strategies by 
comparing trends in key outcome variables in a targeted geographic area (identified 
as a neighborhood, policing district, or well-defined zone) to trends in key outcome 
variables in comparison areas.  The Chicago study used propensity score matching 
techniques to identify very similar comparison policing districts to compare against 
the targeted policing districts.  The Los Angeles study used two non-equivalent 
comparisons (the target area relative to the remainder of the larger neighborhood; 
the targeted neighborhood relative to the surrounding larger geographic community 
area).  The Los Angeles study also used propensity score matching techniques to 
identify similar Census block groups to compare against the Census block groups 
that comprised the targeted area.  The Newark evaluation used crime mapping 
technology and simple matching techniques to identify a comparison gun hot spot 
area that was similar to the targeted Ceasefire zone in terms of gunshot wounding 
incidents, geographic size, and socio-demographic characteristics.  The Nashville 
and Rockford studies compared crime trends in targeted neighborhoods relative to 
crime trends in the surrounding County and city areas, respectively. 
Five studies evaluated the crime reduction effects of citywide pulling levers 
interventions. The Boston, Indianapolis, Lowell, and Stockton quasi-experimental 
designs compared citywide trends in key outcomes to citywide trends in key 
outcomes in sets of non-equivalent cities that did not experience a pulling levers 
intervention during the study time period.  The Cincinnati evaluation compared 
citywide trends in homicides involving members of criminally-active groups targeted 
by the pulling levers intervention relative to trends in homicides that did not involve 
members of criminally-active groups. 
Three studies examined possible immediate spatial crime displacement and 
diffusion of crime control benefits that may have been generated by the pulling 
levers interventions (Los Angeles, Nashville, and Newark).  Only one study noted 
potential threats to the integrity of the treatment.  Tita et al. (2003) reported that 
the Los Angeles pulling levers intervention was not fully implemented as planned.  
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The implementation of the Ceasefire program in the Boyle Heights neighborhood of 
Los Angeles was negatively affected by the well-known Ramparts LAPD police 
corruption scandal and a lack of ownership of the intervention by the participating 
agencies. 
4.3  NARRATIVE REVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF PULLING 
LEVERS FOCUSED DETERRENCE STRATEGIES ON 
CRIME 
This section provides a brief narrative review of the effects of the eligible pulling 
levers focused deterrence interventions on crime.  Table 3 summarizes the main 
effects of the intervention on crime outcomes and, when measured, crime 
displacement and diffusion of crime control benefits effects. A more detailed 
narrative review of the focused deterrence strategies contained in the eligible studies 
is provided in Appendix C.  Nine of the ten evaluations of pulling levers focused 
deterrence strategies reported statistically-significant crime reduction effects 
associated with the approach.  While the authors did report a noteworthy non-
statistically significant reduction in gunshot wound incidents, only the evaluation of 
Newark’s Operation Ceasefire did not report any statistically significant crime 
prevention benefits generated by the violence reduction strategy.   
Evaluations of focused deterrence strategies targeting gangs and criminally-active 
groups reported large statistically-significant reductions in violent crime; these 
results included: a 63% reduction in youth homicides in Boston, 44% reduction in 
gun assault incidents in Lowell, 42% reduction in gun homicides in Stockton, 35% 
reduction in homicides of criminally-active group members in Cincinnati, 34% 
reduction in total homicides in Indianapolis, and significant short-term reductions 
in violent crime in Los Angeles.  The two drug market intervention evaluations also 
reported statistically significant crime reductions.  In Nashville, the drug market 
intervention generated a 55% reduction in illegal drug possession incidents. In 
Rockford, the drug market intervention generated a 22% reduction in non-violent 
offenses.  While Newark’s strategy did not generate statistically significant crime 
control gains when high-rate offenders were targeted, the other two individual-
focused programs reported statistically significant crime reductions.  In Chicago, the 
PSN intervention was associated with a 37% reduction in homicide.  
Two of the three studies that measured possible crime displacement and diffusion 
effects reported noteworthy diffusion of crime control benefits associated with the 
focused deterrence intervention. Consistent with the absence of a treatment effect, 
the Newark evaluation did not report any statistically significant crime displacement 
or diffusion effects.  The Nashville evaluation reported statistically significant 
reductions in drug offenses and total calls for service in the non-treated area 
immediately adjoining the targeted drug market area.  The Los Angeles evaluation 
found statistically-significant reductions in violent crime in treatment census block 
groups surrounding the treatment census block groups as well as noteworthy 
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reductions in violent offending by non-treated gangs that were “socially-tied” to 
treatment gangs. 
To test the statistical significance of the observed distribution of crime reduction 
effects reported by the ten eligible studies, we used an application of the binomial 
distribution known as the sign test (Blalock, 1979).  This simple test examines the 
probabilities of getting an observed proportion of successes from a population of 
equal proportions of successes and failures.  Nine of the ten studies (90.0%) 
reported noteworthy crime reductions associated with the pulling levers approach.  
According to the sign test, this result was statistically significant (exact binomial two 
tailed probability = .0215).    
4.4  META-ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF PULLING 
LEVERS STRATEGIES ON CRIME 
It is important to note here that, while the impacts of the pulling levers focused 
deterrence programs were measured at larger areal units (city, policing area, 
targeted zone, census unit), these interventions were highly focused on a small 
number of risky individuals and risky groups who tend to commit their crimes at a 
relatively small number of high crime places within those larger areas.  Pulling 
levers focused deterrence strategies are highly targeted interventions that are not 
broadly diffused across large populations or large areas.  Computation of effect sizes 
in the studies was not always direct. The goal was to convert all observed effects into 
a standardized mean difference effect size metric. None of the studies we examined 
calculated standardized effect sizes, and indeed, it was sometimes difficult to 
develop precise effect size metrics from published materials. This reflects a more 
general problem in crime and justice with “reporting validity” (Farrington, 2006; 
Lösel and Köferl, 1989), and has been documented in recent reviews of reporting 
validity in crime and justice studies (see Perry and Johnson, 2008; Perry et al., 
2010).  
As described earlier, David B. Wilson’s Effect Size Calculator was used to calculate 
the standardized mean difference effect sizes for all outcomes in the eligible studies.  
For the Boston, Lowell, and Stockton studies, we calculated standardized mean 
effect sizes based on newly-estimated Ordinary Least Squares regression models 
that used the same covariates and modeling choices as the count regression models 
in the original evaluations.7
 
7 We could not find a satisfactory method of calculating effect sizes based on the reported treatment 
coefficients estimated by the Poisson and negative binomial regression models used in these 
evaluations.  Braga was involved as the lead author of the Boston, Lowell, and Stockton studies and ran 
the new OLS regressions from the original study data.  The treatment dummy variables in the new 
models produced an “adjusted” mean difference for the intervention effect for each of the outcome 
variables.  The unstandardized regression coefficients, standard deviation of the dependent variables, 
and treatment and control Ns were entered into the Effect Size Calculator to calculate the standardized 
mean difference effect size.  It is important to note that, despite the change from count regression 
  For the Chicago, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Nashville, 
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Newark, and Rockford, we calculated standardized mean effect sizes based on the t-
test results reported for the intervention variables’ effects on the outcome variables.8
Using the mean effect criterion for all eligible studies, the forest plots in Figure 1 
show the standardized difference in means between the treatment and control or 
comparison conditions (effect size) with a 95 percent confidence interval plotted 
around them for all eligible studies. Points plotted to the right of 0 indicate a 
treatment effect; in this case, the study showed a reduction in crime or disorder. 
Points to the left of 0 indicate a backfire effect where control conditions improved 
relative to treatment conditions. Since the Q statistic which was significant at the p < 
.05 level (Q = 41.752, df = 9), we used a random effects model to estimate the overall 
mean effect size based on a heterogeneous distribution of effect sizes. The meta-
analysis of effect sizes suggests a strongly significant effect in favor of pulling levers 
focused deterrence strategies. The overall effect size for these studies is .604 (see 
Cohen, 1988). This is above Cohen’s standard for a medium effect of .50 and below 
that of a large effect at .80 (Cohen, 1988).  Nonetheless, the overall effect size is 
relatively large compared to assessments of interventions in crime and justice work 
more generally.  
  
For the Los Angeles study, we acquired the original evaluation data, calculated the 
mean gain scores, pre-test and post-test standard deviations, and paired t-tests, and 
entered these data into the Effect Size Calculator to estimate the standardized mean 
difference effect sizes. In Appendix C, we provide effect sizes for each outcome for 
the ten eligible studies. 
All studies reported effect sizes that favor treatment conditions over control 
conditions, with only the Cincinnati, Los Angeles, and Newark studies not reporting 
statistically significant effect sizes.  The Lowell (1.186) and Indianapolis (1.039) 
studies reported the largest statistically significant effect sizes while the Chicago 
study (.181) reported the smallest statistically significant effect size.  The forest plots 
in Figures 2 and 3 present the meta-analyses of the largest and smallest effect sizes 
for each study, respectively.9
 
models to OLS models, there were no substantive changes in the direction, size, or statistically 
significance of the treatment estimates for these studies. 
  For the largest effect size meta-analysis, the overall 
standardize mean difference effect size was large (.806) and statistically significant 
at the p < .05 level.  For the smallest effect size meta-analysis, the overall 
8 If t-tests were not reported, we calculated these statistics by dividing the reported coefficient by the 
reported standard error.  The Cincinnati and Rockford evaluations used count regression models to 
estimate treatment effects.  Based on our request, Professor Nicholas Corsaro, a lead analyst on both 
evaluations, ran new OLS regression models using the same covariates and modeling choices as the 
original evaluations.  We used the OLS t-test results for the intervention variables’ effects on the 
outcome variables to calculate the standardized mean effect sizes.  It is important to note that, despite 
the change from count regression models to OLS models, there were no substantive changes in the 
direction, size, or statistically significance of the treatment estimates for these studies. 
9 Random effects models were used to estimate the overall standardized mean effect sizes.  For the 
largest effect size meta-analysis, Q = 57.002, df = 9, p < 0.0001.  For the smallest effect size meta-
analysis, Q = 46.952, df = 9, p < 0.000. 
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standardize mean difference effect size was medium (.474) and statistically 
significant at the p < .05 level.  
4.5  PROGRAM TYPE AND RESEARCH DESIGN AS EFFECT 
SIZE MODERATORS 
Our narrative review documented that pulling levers focused deterrence strategies 
have been directed at reducing crime by street gangs and criminally-active groups, 
drug markets, and high-risk individuals in high-crime areas. These programs 
represent differing applications of pulling levers strategies to control distinct types 
of problems. Moderator variables help to explain and understand differences across 
studies in the outcomes observed.  Program type could be an influential moderator 
of the observed effect sizes in our overall meta-analysis.  Figure 4 presents a random 
effects model examining the three different program types identified in the narrative 
review. It is important to note that the Q-statistic associated with the between group 
variation was large and statistically significant (Q = 20.430, df = 2, p <.05), 
suggesting that program type is influential in determining effect sizes.  The gang / 
group intervention programs were associated with the largest within-group effect 
size (.770, p <.05), followed by the drug market intervention (DMI) programs (.661, 
p <.05) and the high-risk individuals programs (.186, p <.05).  When program type 
was included as a moderator, the meta-analysis estimated a more modest overall 
effect size (.306, p<.05). 
Pulling levers focused deterrence strategies directed at high-risk individuals in high-
crime areas generated a smaller within-group effect size when compared to the DMI 
and gang / group intervention strategies.  These smaller effect sizes may, in part, 
stem from methodological decisions to analyze outcomes at the area level rather 
than the individual level. As described in our narrative review, the Chicago PSN 
quasi-experimental evaluation conducted additional analyses of the effects of the 
intervention on individual recidivism patterns.  As an exploratory exercise, we 
calculated an effect size for the Chicago (.434, SE = .050, p < .05). This medium and 
statistically significant effect size suggests a program impact similar to area-level 
impacts generated by the DMI and gang / group interventions. 
Given the important distinction in methodological quality between the non-
equivalent quasi-experiments and the quasi-experiments that used matching 
techniques to identify comparison groups, we also examined research design as a 
moderator variable. Figure 5 presents a random effects model examining the two 
different classes of quasi-experimental designs included in this review.10
 
10 For the overall model, Q = 41.725, df = 9, p < 0.0001. 
 It is 
important to note that the Q-statistic associated with the between group variation 
was large and statistically significant (Q = 31.039, df = 1, p <.05), suggesting that 
research design is influential in determining effect sizes.  Consistent with prior 
research suggesting that weaker designs are more likely to report stronger effects in 
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crime and justice studies (Weisburd et al., 2001; Welsh et al., 2011), the non-
equivalent quasi-experimental designs were associated with a much larger within-
group effect size (.766, p <.05) relative to the matched quasi-experimental designs 
(.196, p <.05). When research design type was included as a moderator, the meta-
analysis estimated a more modest overall effect size (.312, p<.05). 
Lipsey (2003) cautions that analyses that include single moderator variables can be 
misleading as these types of analyses can be confounded by the absence of other 
relevant variables.  In this analysis, “research design type” is highly correlated with 
“program type.” Five of the six gang / group intervention studies used non-
equivalent quasi-experimental designs to analyze program effects.  With the 
noteworthy exception of the Los Angeles evaluation, the five gang / group 
intervention programs attempted to influence ongoing feuds among gangs and 
groups in conflict networks that spanned the urban landscape.  For instance, the 
authors of the Boston Ceasefire evaluation reported that, given the nature of their 
intervention and the dynamics of the problem, it was not possible to set aside 
within-city control gangs or comparison areas (Braga et al., 2001). 
4.6  PUBLICATION BIAS 
Publication bias presents a strong challenge to any review of evaluation studies 
(Rothstein, 2008). Campbell reviews, such as ours, take a number of steps to reduce 
publication bias, as represented by the fact that four of the 10 eligible studies in our 
review came from unpublished sources (one government report and three 
unpublished reports). Wilson (2009) has argued moreover that there is often little 
difference in methodological quality between published and unpublished studies 
suggesting the importance of searching the “grey literature.” As a first step in 
investigating potential publication bias, we compared mean effect sizes for 
unpublished vs. published studies. Using random effects models, the mean effect 
size for published studies is 0.713 (p < .05) and for unpublished studies, the average 
effect is 0.384 (p < .05). While the published studies report larger effect sizes, the 
similarity in the direction and statistical significance in the mean effect sizes 
between the published and unpublished literature suggests that publication bias 
may not have major impact on the outcomes of this review. 
We then used the trim-and-fill procedure (Duval and Tweedie 2000) to estimate the 
effect of potential data censoring, such as publication bias, on the outcome of the 
meta-analyses. The diagnostic funnel plot is based on the idea that, in the absence of 
bias, the plot of study effect sizes should be symmetric about the mean effect size. If 
there is asymmetry, the trim-and-fill procedure imputes the missing studies, adds 
them to the analysis, and then re-computes the mean effect size.  A visual inspection 
of the resulting funnel plot indicated some asymmetry with more studies with a 
large effect and a large standard error to the right of the mean than the left of the 
mean. The trim-and-fill procedure determined that three studies should be added to 
create symmetry. The funnel plot with imputed studies is presented in Figure 4. 
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These additional studies modestly altered the mean effect size estimate. The mean 
random effect decreased from 0.604 (95% CI = 0.349, 0.859) to 0.437 (95% CI = 
0.200, 0.637). Indeed, the 95 percent confidence intervals overlap, suggesting that 
the mean effect sizes may actually be the same. 
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5 Conclusion 
The available scientific evidence on the crime reduction value of focused deterrence 
strategies has been previously characterized as “promising” but “descriptive rather 
than evaluative” (Skogan and Frydl, 2004: 241) and as “limited” but “still evolving” 
(Wellford et al., 2005: 10) by the U.S. National Research Council’s Committee to 
Review Research on Police Policy and Practices and Committee to Improve Research 
Information and Data on Firearms, respectively.  Our systematic review identified 
ten evaluations of focused deterrence strategies; nine of these evaluations were 
completed after the National Research Council reports were published.  A better-
developed base of scientific evidence now exists to assess whether crime prevention 
impacts are associated with this approach. 
The basic findings of our review are very positive. Nine out of ten eligible studies 
reported strong and statistically significant crime reductions associated with the 
approach.  Nonetheless, we are concerned with the lack of rigorous randomized 
experimental evaluations of this promising approach.  While the biases in quasi-
experimental research are not clear (e.g. Campbell and Boruch, 1975; Wilkinson and 
Task Force on Statistical Inference, 1999), recent reviews in crime and justice 
suggest that weaker research designs often lead to more positive outcomes (e.g. see 
Weisburd, Lum, and Petrosino, 2001; Welsh et al., 2011).  This does not mean that 
non-experimental studies cannot be of high quality, but only that there is evidence 
that non-experimental designs in crime and justice are likely to overstate outcomes 
as contrasted with randomized experiments.  In his review of situational crime 
prevention evaluations, Guerette (2009) finds that the conclusions of randomized 
evaluations were generally consistent with the majority conclusion of the non-
randomized evaluations.  While our narrative review is consistent with Guerette’s 
(2009) conclusion, our calculated effect sizes reveal that less rigorous focused 
deterrence evaluation designs were associated with stronger reported effects.  As 
such, we think that caution should be used in drawing conclusions regarding 
population effect sizes for the pulling levers intervention.  
At the same time, the effects observed in the studies reviewed were often very large, 
and such effect sizes are evidenced as well in those studies using strong comparison 
groups (e.g. Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan, 2007).  Our review provides strong 
empirical evidence for the crime prevention effectiveness of focused deterrence 
strategies.  Even if we assume that the effects observed contain some degree of 
upward bias, it appears that the overall impact of such programs is noteworthy.  
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These findings are certainly encouraging, and point to the promises of this 
approach. 
We certainly believe that the positive outcomes of the present studies indicate that 
additional experimental evaluations, however difficult and costly, are warranted.  
The potential barriers are real, especially in regards to identifying valid treatment 
and comparison areas.  But existing evidence is strong enough to warrant a large 
investment in multi-site experiments (Weisburd and Taxman, 2000).  Such 
experiments could solve the problem of small numbers of places in single 
jurisdictions, and would also allow for examination of variation in effectiveness 
across contexts. 
Despite our concerns over the lack of randomized experiments, we believe that the 
findings of eligible focused deterrence evaluations fit well within existing research 
suggesting that deterrence-based strategies, if applied correctly, can reduce crime 
(Apel and Nagin, 2011). The focused deterrence approach seems to have the 
desirable characteristic of altering offenders’ perceptions of sanction risk.  Our 
findings are also supported by the growing body of scientific evidence that suggests 
police departments, and their partners, can be effective in controlling specific crime 
problems when they engage a variety of partners, and tailor an array of tactics to 
address underlying criminogenic conditions and dynamics (Braga, 2008a; Weisburd 
and Eck, 2004).  Indeed, our study suggests that Durlauf and Nagin (2011) are 
correct in their conclusion that imprisonment and crime can both be reduced 
through the noteworthy marginal deterrent effects generated by allocating police 
officers, and their criminal justice partners, in ways that heighten the perceived risk 
of apprehension. 
While the results of this review are very supportive of deterrence principles, we 
believe that other complementary crime control mechanisms are at work in the 
focused deterrence strategies described here that need to be highlighted and better 
understood (see Weisburd, 2011).  In Durlauf and Nagin’s (2011) article, the focus is 
on the possibilities for increasing perceived risk and deterrence by increasing police 
presence. Although this conclusion is warranted by the data and represents an 
important component of the causal mechanisms that have increased the 
effectiveness of focused deterrence strategies, we believe it misses an important part 
of the story.   In the focused deterrence approach, the emphasis is not only on 
increasing the risk of offending, it is also on decreasing opportunity structures for 
violence, deflecting offenders away from crime, increasing the collective efficacy of 
communities, and increasing the legitimacy of police actions.   Indeed, we suspect 
that the large effects we observe come precisely from the multi-faceted ways in 
which this program influences criminals. 
A number of scholars have focused on the mechanism of “discouragement” when 
discussing crime prevention benefits of interventions (see, e.g. Clarke and Weisburd, 
1994).  Discouragement emphasizes reducing the opportunities for crime and 
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increasing alternative opportunity structures for offenders.   In this context, 
situational crime prevention techniques are often implemented as part of the core 
pulling levers work in focused deterrence strategies (Braga and Kennedy, 2012; 
Skubak Tillyer and Kennedy, 2008). For instance, the Cincinnati Initiative to 
Reduce Violence used civil forfeiture techniques to close down a highly problematic 
bar that generated recurring serious violence (Engel, Corsaro, and Skubak Tillyer, 
2010). Extending guardianship, assisting natural surveillance, strengthening formal 
surveillance, reducing the anonymity of offenders, and utilizing place managers can 
greatly enhance the range and the quality of the varying enforcement and regulatory 
levers that can be pulled on offending groups and key actors in criminal networks 
(see, e.g. Welsh and Farrington, 2009).  The focused deterrence approach also seeks 
to redirect offenders away from violent crime through the provision of social services 
and opportunities.   In all the gang / group interventions reviewed here, gang 
members were offered job training, employment, substance abuse treatment, 
housing assistance, and a variety of other services and opportunities. 
Aspects of “broken windows” theory may also be relevant for our understanding of 
how and why focused deterrence programs reduce crime (Wilson and Kelling, 1982).   
Broken windows theory argues that intensive efforts by police to reduce social and 
physical disorder can reverse the breakdown of community social controls that 
accompanies untended and unrestrained violations of social order. Thus, crime is 
reduced in part because of efforts by the police and in part because of increased 
vigilance by community members.   Kleiman and Smith (1990: 88) describe the 
potential benefits of an intensive police effort to reduce drug crime and disorder by 
noting “a dramatic police effort may call forth increased neighborhood efforts at self-
protection against drug dealing activity; given police resources such self-defense 
may be essential to long-run control of drug dealing.”   
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) emphasize the capacity of a community to 
realize common values and regulate behavior within it through cohesive 
relationships and mutual trust among residents. They argue that the key factor 
determining whether crime will flourish is a sense of the “collective efficacy” of a 
community. A community with strong collective efficacy is characterized by “high 
capacities for collective action for the public good” (St. Jean, 2007: 3).  Focused 
deterrence enhances collective efficacy in communities by emphasizing the 
importance of engaging and enlisting community members in the strategies 
developed. The High Point DMI strategy, for example, drew upon collective efficacy 
principles by engaging family, friends, and other “influential” community members 
in addressing the criminal behaviors of local drug dealers (Kennedy, 2009).   
Finally, the focused deterrence approach takes advantage of recent theorizing 
regarding procedural justice and legitimacy.   The effectiveness of policing is 
dependent on public perceptions of the legitimacy of police actions (Skogan and 
Frydl, 2004; Tyler, 1990, 2004). Legitimacy is the public belief that there is a 
responsibility and obligation to voluntarily accept and defer to the decisions made 
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by authorities (Tyler, 1990, 2004).  Recent studies suggest that when procedural 
justice approaches are used by the police citizens will not only evaluate the 
legitimacy of the police more highly, they will also be more likely to obey the law in 
the future (see, e.g. Paternoster et al., 1997).  Advocates of focused deterrence 
strategies argue that targeted offenders should be treated with respect and dignity 
(Kennedy, 2008, 2009), reflecting procedural justice principles.  The Chicago PSN 
strategy, for instance, sought to increase the likelihood that the offenders would 
“buy in” and voluntarily comply with the pro-social, anti-violence norms being 
advocated by interacting with offenders in ways that enhance procedural justice in 
their communication sessions (Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan, 2007).   
In closing, we think it is important to recognize that focused deterrence strategies 
are a very recent addition to the existing scholarly literature on crime control and 
prevention strategies.  While the evaluation evidence needs to be strengthened and 
the theoretical underpinnings of the approach needs further refinement, we believe 
that jurisdictions suffering from gang violence, overt drug markets, and repeat 
offender problems should add focused deterrence strategies to their existing 
portfolio of prevention and control interventions. The existing evidence suggests 
these new approaches to crime prevention and control generate noteworthy crime 
reductions.  
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6 Plans for Updating the Review 
The authors expect to update the review every five years.  
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9 Tables 
9.1  CHARACTERISTICS OF ELIGLBLE PULLING LEVERS 
FOCUSED DETERRENCE EVALUATIONS 
N=10   
City population N Percent 
Small (< 200,000 residents) 2 20.0 
Medium (200,000 – 500,000 residents) 3 30.0 
Large (> 500,000 residents) 5 50.0 
 
Study type N Percent 
Quasi-experiment with matched comparison group 2 20.0 
Quasi-experiment with non-equivalent comparison group 7 70.0 
Quasi-experiment with both types of comparison groups 1 10.0 
 
Intervention type N Percent 
Gang / group violence 6 60.0 
Individual crime 2 20.0 
Drug market 2 20.0 
 
Publication type N Percent 
Peer-reviewed journal 6 60.0 
Published report 1 10.0 
Unpublished report 3 30.0 
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Completion year N Percent 
2001 – 2002 1 10.0 
2003 – 2004 1 10.0 
2005 – 2006 1 10.0 
2007 – 2008 3 30.0 
2009 – 2010 4 40.0 
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9.2  ELIGIBLE PULLING LEVERS FOCUSED DETERRENCE 
EVALUATIONS 
Study Treatment Units of Analysis Research Design 
Operation Ceasefire 
 
Boston, Massachusetts 
 
Braga, Kennedy, Waring, 
and Piehl (2001) 
Pulling levers strategy 
focused on reducing serious 
violence by street gangs 
 
24 month post-intervention 
period (June 1996 – May 
1998) 
 
No threats to integrity of 
treatment noted during 
program implementation  
 
Citywide intervention 
 
Outcome measures 
included monthly counts of 
citywide youth homicide 
incidents, citywide gun 
assault incidents, citywide 
shots fired calls for service, 
and youth gun assault 
incidents in one high-risk 
district  
Non-equivalent quasi-
experiment comparing youth 
homicide trends in Boston 
relative to youth homicide 
trends in 39 other U.S. cities 
and 29 New England cities 
 
Count-based regression 
models controlling for trends 
and seasonal variations used 
to estimate impact of 
intervention on time series 
Indianapolis Violence 
Reduction Partnership 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
McGarrell, Chermak, 
Wilson, and Corsaro (2006)  
Pulling levers strategy 
focused on reducing serious 
violence by street gangs 
 
27 month post-intervention 
period (April 1999 – June 
2001) 
 
No threats to integrity of 
treatment noted during 
program implementation  
Citywide intervention 
 
Outcome measure was the 
monthly count of citywide 
homicides 
Non-equivalent quasi-
experiment comparing 
homicide trends in 
Indianapolis relative to 
homicide trends in six cities 
selected based on population 
and Midwestern location 
 
ARIMA models controlling for 
trends and seasonal 
variations used to estimate 
impact of intervention on 
time series 
Operation Peacekeeper 
 
Stockton, California 
 
Braga (2008) 
Pulling levers strategy 
focused on reducing serious 
violence by street gangs 
 
65 month post-intervention 
period (September 1997 – 
December 2002) 
 
Citywide intervention 
 
Outcome measure was the 
monthly count of citywide 
gun homicides 
Non-equivalent quasi-
experiment comparing gun 
homicide trends in Stockton 
relative to gun homicide 
trends in eight cities selected 
based on population and 
California location 
 
Count-based regression 
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Study Treatment Units of Analysis Research Design 
No threats to integrity of 
treatment noted during 
program implementation  
 
models controlling for trends 
and seasonal variations used 
to estimate impact of 
intervention on time series 
Project Safe 
Neighborhoods 
 
Lowell, Massachusetts 
 
Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, 
Bond, and Cronin (2008) 
Pulling levers strategy 
focused on reducing serious 
violence by street gangs 
 
39 month post-intervention 
period (October 2002 – 
December 2005) 
 
No threats to integrity of 
treatment noted during 
program implementation  
 
Citywide intervention 
 
Outcome measure was the 
monthly count of fatal and 
non-fatal gun assault 
incidents 
Non-equivalent quasi-
experiment comparing gun 
assault trends in Lowell 
relative to gun assault trends 
in the State of 
Massachusetts and eight 
Massachusetts cities 
selected based on 
population, demographics,  
and yearly numbers of gun 
assaults 
 
Count-based and maximum-
likelihood regression models 
controlling for trends and 
seasonal variations used to 
estimate impact of 
intervention on time series 
Cincinnati Initiative to 
Reduce Violence 
 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
 
Engel, Corsaro, and Skubak 
Tillyer (2010) 
Pulling levers strategy 
focused on reducing serious 
violence by criminally-active 
street groups 
 
37 month post-intervention 
period (October 2007 – 
September 2009) 
 
No threats to integrity of 
treatment noted during 
program implementation  
Citywide intervention 
 
Outcome measures were 
the monthly counts of 
citywide group member-
involved and non-group 
member-involved homicides 
Non-equivalent quasi-
experiment comparing 
group-member-involved 
homicide trends relative to 
non-group-member-involved 
homicides 
 
Count-based regression 
models controlling for trends 
and seasonal variations used 
to estimate impact of 
intervention on time series 
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Study Treatment Units of Analysis Research Design 
Operation Ceasefire 
 
Newark, New Jersey 
 
Boyle, Lanterman, 
Pascarella, and Cheng 
(2010) 
 
Violence reduction strategy 
targeting individual gang 
members described as a 
“hybrid” between the Boston 
Ceasefire pulling levers 
strategy and the Chicago 
Ceasefire streetworker 
program 
 
85 week post-intervention 
period (May 11, 2005 – 
December 31, 2006) 
 
No threats to integrity of 
treatment noted during 
program implementation 
Intervention implemented in 
two square mile area that 
experienced elevated levels 
of gun violence 
 
Outcome measure was the 
weekly number of gunshot 
wound incidents 
 
Near-equivalent quasi-
experiment comparing 
gunshot wound trends in the 
targeted area relative to 
gunshot wound trends in a 
comparison area selected 
based on similar levels of 
gun violence, geographic 
size, and demographic 
characteristics 
 
ARIMA models controlling for 
trends and seasonal 
variations used to estimate 
impact of intervention on 
time series 
Operation Ceasefire 
 
Los Angeles, California 
 
Tita, Riley, Ridgeway, 
Grammich, Abrahamse, and 
Greenwood (2003) 
 
Pulling levers strategy 
focused on reducing serious 
violence by criminally-active 
street groups 
 
Six month post-intervention 
period (October 2000 – 
February 2001) 
 
Evaluation team reported 
that integrity of the 
treatment was undermined 
due to a lack of commitment 
to the strategy by working 
group members and the 
unintended consequences 
of a police corruption 
scandal 
 
Intervention was 
implemented in a target 
area within the Boyle 
Heights neighborhood of 
Los Angeles 
 
Outcome measures were 
monthly counts of violent 
crime incidents, gang crime 
incidents, and gun crime 
incidents 
 
 
Quasi-experimental 
evaluation used two non-
equivalent comparisons (the 
target area relative to the 
remainder of Boyle Heights; 
Boyle Heights relative to the 
surrounding larger 
Hollenbeck community) and 
one near-equivalent 
comparison (Census block 
groups matched via 
propensity score analyses) 
 
A variety of regression-based 
models were used to 
estimate the impact of the 
intervention on the 
distribution of monthly counts 
of the key outcome variables 
for six month pre-
intervention, four month 
suppression, and two month 
deterrence time periods 
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Study Treatment Units of Analysis Research Design 
Project Safe 
Neighborhoods 
 
Chicago, Illinois 
 
Papachristos, Meares, and 
Fagan (2007) 
 
Gun violence reduction 
strategy comprised of four 
interventions: (1) increased 
federal prosecutions for 
convicted felons carrying or 
using guns, (2) lengthy 
sentences associated with 
federal prosecutions, (3) 
supply-side firearm policing 
activities, and (4) social 
marketing of deterrence and 
social norms messages 
through offender notification 
meetings 
 
32 month post-intervention 
period (May 2002 – 
December 2004) 
 
No threats to integrity of 
treatment noted during 
program implementation  
 
Intervention was 
implemented in two 
adjacent policing districts 
that experienced very high 
levels of homicide  
 
Outcome measures were 
monthly and quarterly 
counts of homicides, gun 
homicides, gang homicides, 
and aggravated assault and 
battery incidents 
Quasi-experimental 
evaluation comparing trends 
in targeted policing districts 
to trends in near-equivalent 
policing districts matched via 
propensity score analysis 
 
Hierarchical generalized 
linear growth curve 
regression models used to 
estimate impact of 
intervention on time series 
 
Drug Market Intervention  
 
Nashville, Tennessee 
 
Corsaro and McGarrell 
(2009) 
Pulling levers strategy 
focused on reducing crime 
driven by street-level drug 
market 
 
14 month post-intervention 
period (March 2008 – April 
2009) 
 
No threats to integrity of 
treatment noted during 
program implementation  
Intervention was 
implemented in the 
McFerrin Park 
neighborhood of Nashville 
 
Outcome measures were 
monthly count of violent 
crime incidents, property 
crime incidents, illegal drug 
possession incidents, illegal 
drug equipment incidents, 
and total calls for service 
Non-equivalent quasi-
experimental design 
comparing trends in the 
intervention neighborhood to 
trends in the remainder of 
Davidson County 
 
ARIMA models controlling for 
trends and seasonal 
variations used to estimate 
impact of intervention on 
time series 
 44   The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
 
Study Treatment Units of Analysis Research Design 
Drug Market Intervention 
 
Rockford, Illinois 
 
Corsaro, Brunson, and 
McGarrell (2010) 
Pulling levers strategy 
focused on reducing crime 
driven by street-level drug 
market 
 
14 month post-intervention 
period (May 2007 – June 
2008) 
 
No threats to integrity of 
treatment noted during 
program implementation  
Intervention was 
implemented in the 
Delancey Heights 
neighborhood of Rockford 
 
Outcome measures were 
monthly count of violent 
crime incidents and non-
violent crime incidents 
Non-equivalent quasi-
experimental design 
comparing trends in the 
intervention neighborhood to 
trends in the remainder of 
Rockford 
 
Hierarchical generalized 
linear growth curve 
regression models used to 
estimate impact of 
intervention on time series 
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9.3  RESULTS OF ELIGIBLE PULLING LEVERS FOCUSED 
DETERRENCE EVALUATIONS 
Study Crime Outcomes Displacement / Diffusion 
Operation Ceasefire 
 
Boston, Massachusetts 
 
Braga, Kennedy, Waring, 
and Piehl (2001) 
Statistically significant 63% reduction in youth 
homicides, 25% reduction in gun assaults, 32% 
reduction in shots fired calls for service, and 44% 
reduction in youth gun assaults in one high-risk 
district 
 
Not measured 
Indianapolis Violence 
Reduction Partnership 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana  
 
McGarrell, Chermak, Wilson, 
and Corsaro (2006) 
Statistically significant 34% reduction in total 
homicide 
Not measured 
Operation Peacekeeper 
 
Stockton, California 
 
Braga (2008) 
Statistically significant 42% reduction in gun 
homicide 
Not measured  
Project Safe 
Neighborhoods 
 
Lowell, Massachusetts 
 
Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, 
Bond, and Cronin (2008) 
Statistically significant 44% reduction in gun 
assault incidents 
Not measured  
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Study Crime Outcomes Displacement / Diffusion 
Cincinnati Initiative to 
Reduce Violence 
 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
Engel, Skubak Tillyer, 
Dunham, Hall, Ozer, 
Henson, and Godsey (2009) 
Statistically significant 35% reduction in group 
member-involved homicides 
 
 
Not measured  
Operation Ceasefire 
 
Newark, New Jersey 
 
Boyle, Lanterman, 
Pascarella, and Cheng 
(2010) 
 
No statistically significant reduction in gunshot 
wound victims in target zone 
 
Used dual kernel density 
spatial analyses to examine 
the distribution of gunshot 
wound hot spots around 
target and comparison zones 
before and after the 
intervention was implemented 
 
The results of the analysis 
were inconclusive 
 
Operation Ceasefire 
 
Los Angeles, California 
 
Tita, Riley, Ridgeway, 
Grammich, Abrahamse, and 
Greenwood (2003) 
 
In Boyle Heights, gang crime decreased 
significantly compared with other regions of 
Hollenbeck during the suppression period of the 
intervention, and violent, gang, and gun crime all 
decreased significantly in the deterrence period 
 
In the five targeted police reporting districts, violent 
crime decreased 
significantly in comparison with the rest of Boyle 
Heights in the suppression 
and the deterrence periods, and gang crime 
decreased significantly in the suppression period 
 
In the Census block groups overlapping the 
targeted reporting districts, violent crime decreased 
significantly compared with the matched blocks. 
Examined immediate spatial 
displacement and diffusion 
effects in 11 Census block 
groups surrounding targeted 
Census block groups and 
gang crime committed by 
non-targeted gangs that were 
“socially tied” to targeted 
gangs 
 
Analyses suggested strong 
diffusion of crime control 
benefits into Census block 
groups immediately 
surrounding targeted area 
and a reduction in gang crime 
associated with the “socially 
tied” gangs  
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Study Crime Outcomes Displacement / Diffusion 
Project Safe 
Neighborhoods 
 
Chicago, Illinois 
 
Papachristos, Meares, and 
Fagan (2007) 
 
Statistically significant 37% reduction in total 
homicides reported in targeted police districts.  
Statistically significant reductions in gun homicides 
and aggravated assaults in targeted districts also 
reported 
 
No statistically significant reduction in gang 
homicides in targeted police districts 
Not measured 
Drug Market Intervention  
 
Nashville, Tennessee 
 
Corsaro and McGarrell 
(2010) 
Statistically significant 55% reduction in illegal drug 
possession offenses, 37% reduction in drug 
equipment offenses, and 28% reduction in property 
crimes reported in targeted neighborhood 
 
No significant decreases reported in violent crime 
incidents and total calls for service 
Examined immediate spatial 
displacement and diffusion 
effects in areas contiguous to 
the targeted neighborhood 
 
Analyses suggested 
significant diffusion of crime 
control benefits into 
contiguous areas 
Drug Market Intervention 
 
Rockford, Illinois 
 
Corsaro, Brunson, and 
McGarrell (2010) 
Statistically significant 22% reduction in non-violent 
offenses 
 
No significant decreases reported in violent 
offenses 
Not measured 
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10 Figures 
10.1  MEAN EFFECT SIZES FOR AREA OUTCOMES 
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10.2  LARGEST EFFECT SIZES FOR AREA OUTCOMES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.3  SMALLEST EFFECT SIZES FOR AREA OUTCOMES 
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10.4  PROGRAM TYPE AS MODERATOR FOR AREA 
OUTCOMES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.5  RESEARCH DESIGN TYPE AS MODERATOR FOR AREA 
OUTCOMES 
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10.6  FUNNEL PLOT FOR ELIGIBLE STUDIES WITH 
IMPUTED STUDIES FROM TRIM-AND-FILL ANALYSIS 
Note: Empty circles are the original studies. Filled-in circles indicate imputed 
studies from the trim-and-fill analysis.  
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11 Appendix A: List of 90 Experts 
Contacted During Search 
Process 
1. Allan Abrahamse, RAND Corporation 
2. David Bayley, University at Albany, SUNY 
3. Lawrence Bobo, Harvard University 
4. Brenda Bond, Suffolk University 
5. Robert Boruch, University of Pennsylvania 
6. Douglas Boyle, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 
7. Alfred Blumstein, Carnegie Mellon University 
8. Rod Brunson, Rutgers University 
9. Chia-Cherng Cheng, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 
10. Steven Chermak, Michigan State University 
11. Ronald V. Clarke, Rutgers University 
12. Philip J. Cook, Duke University 
13. Nicholas Corsaro, Southern Illinois University 
14. Linda Cottler, Washington University of St. Louis 
15. Shea Cronin, Boston University 
16. Robert Crutchfield, University of Washington 
17. Ruth Davis, The Pymatuning Group 
18. Scott Decker, Arizona State University 
19. Jessica Dunham, University of Cincinnati 
20. John E. Eck, University of Cincinnati 
21. Robin Engel, University of Cincinnati 
22. Jeffrey Fagan, Columbia University 
23. Graham Farrell, Loughborough University 
24. Herman Goldstein, University of Wisconsin 
25. Timothy Godsey, University of Cincinnati 
26. Peter Grabosky, Australian National University 
27. Clifford Grammich, RAND Corporation 
28. Peter Greenwood, Greenwood and Associates 
29. Davin Hall, University of Cincinnati 
30. David Hemenway, Harvard University 
31. William Henson, University of Cincinnati 
32. Natalie K. Hipple, Michigan State University 
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33. Joel Horowitz, Northwestern University 
34. Robert L. Johnson, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 
35. Shane Johnson, University College London 
36. David M. Kennedy, John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
37. Mark A.R. Kleiman, University of California, Los Angeles 
38. David A. Klinger, University of Missouri, St. Louis 
39. John Klofas, Rochester Institute of Technology 
40. Johannes Knutsson, Norwegian Police University College 
41. Jennifer Lanterman, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 
42. Janet Lauritsen, University of Missouri, St. Louis 
43. Gloria Laycock, University College London 
44. Steven Levitt, University of Chicago 
45. Jens Ludwig, University of Chicago 
46. Tracey Maclin, Boston University 
47. Edward R. Maguire, American University 
48. Stephen D. Mastrofski, George Mason University 
49. Lorraine Mazerolle, University of Queensland 
50. Jack McDevitt, Northeastern University 
51. Edmund McGarrell, Michigan State University 
52. Tracey Meares, Yale University 
53. Terrie Moffitt, University of Wisconsin 
54. Mark H. Moore, Harvard University 
55. Susan Murphy, University of Michigan 
56. Daniel Nagin, Carnegie Mellon University 
57. Karen Norberg, Washington University of St. Louis 
58. Murat Ozer, University of Cincinnati 
59. Andrew Papachristos, University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
60. Joseph Pascarella, Capella University 
61. John V. Pepper, University of Virginia 
62. Ruth Peterson, Ohio State University 
63. Anne M. Piehl, Rutgers University 
64. Glenn L. Pierce, Northeastern University 
65. Alex Piquero, Florida State University 
66. Peter Reuter, University of Maryland 
67. Greg Ridgeway, RAND Corporation 
68. K. Jack Riley, RAND Corporation 
69. Dennis Rosenbaum, University of Illinois, Chicago 
70. Richard Rosenfeld, University of Missouri, St. Louis 
71. Elaine B. Sharp, University of Kansas 
72. Lawrence Sherman, University of Cambridge 
73. Wesley Skogan, Northwestern University 
74. Nick Tilley, University College London 
75. Marie S. Tillyer, University of Texas, San Antonio 
76. George E. Tita, University of California, Irvine 
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77. Jeremy Travis, John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
78. Tom Tyler, New York University 
79. Stewart Wakeling, Public Health Institute 
80. Joel Waldfogel, University of Minnesota 
81. Samuel Walker, University of Nebraska, Omaha 
82. Elin J. Waring, Lehman College, CUNY 
83. Alexander Weiss, Northwestern University 
84. Charles Wellford, University of Maryland 
85. James Q. Wilson, Pepperdine University 
86. Jeremy M. Wilson, Michigan State University 
87. Christopher Winship, Harvard University 
88. Garen Wintemute, University of California, Davis 
89. Robert Worden, University at Albany, SUNY 
90. Franklin Zimring, University of California, Berkeley 
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12 Appendix B: Coding Sheets 
12.1  ELIGIBILITY CHECK SHEET 
1. Document ID: __ __ __ __ 
 
2. Study Author Name(s) ________________________________________ 
 
3. Study Title:_____________________________________ 
 
4. Journal Name, Volume and Issue: ________________________________ 
 
5. Document ID: __ __ __ __ 
 
6. Coder’s Initials __ __ __ 
 
7. Date eligibility determined: ____________ 
 
8. A study must meet the following criteria in order to be eligible. Answer each 
question with a “yes” or a “no.” 
a. The study is an evaluation of a pulling levers focused deterrence  
 intervention.  _____ 
 
b. The study includes a comparison group (or a pre-intervention comparison  
period in the case of pre-post studies), which did not receive the treatment 
condition (problem-oriented policing). Studies may be experimental or 
quasi-experimental. ______ 
 
 c. The study reports on at least one crime outcome. ______ 
 
 d. The study is written in English. _____ 
 
If the study does not meet the criteria above, answer the following question: 
a. The study is a review article that is relevant to this project (e.g. may have  
 references to other studies that are useful, may have pertinent background 
information) ____ 
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9. Eligibility status: 
   ____ Eligible 
   ____ Not eligible 
   ____ Relevant review 
 
Notes: 
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________ 
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12.2  CODING PROTOCOL 
Reference Information 
1. Document ID: __ __ __ __ 
 
2. Study author(s): ____________________________________________ 
 
3. Study title: ________________________________________________ 
 
4. Publication type: ______ 
 1. Book 
 2. Book chapter 
 3. Journal article (peer reviewed) 
 4. Thesis or doctoral dissertation 
 5. Government report (state/local) 
 6. Government report (federal) 
 7. Police department report 
 8. Technical report 
 9. Conference paper 
 10. Other (specify))_____________________ 
 
5. Publication date (year): ______________ 
 
6a. Journal Name: ____________________________________________ 
6b. Journal Volume: _______________ 
6c. Journal Issue: ____________ 
 
7. Date range of research (when research was conducted): 
Start: ____________ 
Finish: ____________ 
 
8. Source of funding for study: ____________________________________ 
 
9. Country of publication: ___________________ 
 
10. Date coded: ___________ 
 
11. Coder’s Initials: __ __ __ 
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Describing the Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Intervention 
12a. Did the study formally identify the treatment as a pulling levers policing  
 intervention? 
 1. Yes 
 2. No  
 
12b. If No, what did the study call the intervention?     
  _____________________________________________ 
 
13. What crime problem was targeted for the intervention? (Select all that apply) 
 1. Total homicide 
 2. Youth homicide 
 3. Gun violence 
 4. Drug-related violence 
 5. Street-level drug markets 
 6. Other (specify) _____________ 
 
14. Who were the primary targets of the intervention? (Select all that apply) 
 1. Street gangs 
 2. Semi-organized / organized crime 
 3. Informal criminally-active groups 
 4. Drug-selling crews 
 5. High-risk individuals 
 6. Other group (specify) ___________ 
 
15. If the intervention was primarily targeted at “high-risk individuals,” please 
describe the individuals: (Select all that apply) 
 1. Probationers 
 2. Parolees 
 3. Convicted felons 
 4. Gang members 
 5. Street-level drug dealers 
 6. Other (specify) _____________ 
 
16. Specifically, what event(s) makes up the problem? 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
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17. Was the intervention developed based on an analysis of the targeted problem? 
1. No, the intervention was implemented without any analysis of the targeted  
 problem. 
 2. Yes, the intervention was implemented after a cursory / limited analysis of  
  the targeted problem. 
 3. Yes, the intervention was implemented after a thorough analysis of the  
  targeted  problem. 
 4. Other (specify) _____________ 
 
18. At what unit of analysis was the treatment delivered/intervention directed at? 
(Select all that apply) 
 1. Specific individuals 
 2. Groups of individuals 
 3. Micro places (crime hot spots, specific housing project, etc.) 
 4. Small police-defined units (such as beats) 
 5. Larger police-defined units (such as districts or sectors) 
 6. Neighborhood or community level 
 7. City or town level 
 8. State level 
 9. Other (specify) _____________ 
 
19. What agency was primarily responsible for the implementation of the 
intervention? (Select the lead
 1. Local police 
 agency only) 
 2. State police 
 3. Federal law enforcement agencies (e.g. ATF, DEA, FBI) 
 4. Local / County / State prosecutor 
 5. Federal prosecutor 
 6. Probation 
 7. Parole 
 8. Correctional agency 
 9. Local / County / State governmental agency (e.g. Mayor’s Criminal Justice  
  Office) 
 10. Social service provider 
 11. Community-based agency 
 12. Other (specify) _____________ 
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20. What groups were involved in the implementation of the intervention? (Select all 
that apply) 
 1. Local police 
 2. State police 
 3. Federal law enforcement agencies (e.g. ATF, DEA, FBI) 
 4. Local / County / State prosecutor 
 5. Federal prosecutor 
 6. Probation 
 7. Parole 
 8. Correctional agency 
 9. Local / County / State governmental agency (e.g. Mayor’s Criminal Justice  
  Office) 
 10. Social service provider 
 11. Community-based agency 
 12. Other (specify) _____________ 
 
21. What key elements of the focused deterrence strategy were identified in the 
program evaluation? (Select all that apply) 
 1. Clear “triggering” event that provoke the pulling levers response 
 2. Enforcement levers that could be customized to targeted groups /  
  individuals 
 3. Social services / opportunities for targeted groups / individuals 
 4. Communications strategy 
 5. Other (specify) _____________ 
 
22. If a communications strategy was present, please identify the key elements of the 
message(s) (Select all that apply) 
 1. Deterrence message 
 2. Social service / opportunity-based message 
 3. Changing norms / decision making message 
 4. Reintegration of offender(s) back into community message 
 5. Other (specify) _____________ 
 6. N/A 
 
23. If a communications strategy was present, how were the message(s) delivered / 
marketed to the targeted audience? (Select all that apply) 
 1. Formal meetings (e.g. forums or “call-ins”) 
 2. Home visits 
 3. On the street (i.e. “retail” delivery on corners, in parks, etc.) 
 4. Advertising (e.g. billboards, TV / radio spots, handouts, etc.) 
 5. School assemblies 
 6. Correctional setting (e.g. in-prison meeting, in-juvenile detention facility,  
  etc.) 
 7. Other (specify) _____________ 
 61   The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
 
 8. N/A 
 
24. What did the evaluation indicate about the implementation of the response? _ 
 1. The response was implemented as planned or nearly so 
 2. The response was not implemented or implemented in a radically different  
  way than originally planned 
 3. Unclear/no process evaluation included 
 
25. If the process evaluation indicated there were problems with implementation of 
the response, describe these problems: 
_________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________ 
 
26. If the process evaluation identified inadequate participation by involved 
agencies, indicate the agencies below that were responsible for weak participation 
(Select all that apply) 
 1. Local police 
 2. State police 
 3. Federal law enforcement agencies (e.g. ATF, DEA, FBI) 
 4. Local / County / State prosecutor 
 5. Federal prosecutor 
 6. Probation 
 7. Parole 
 8. Correctional agency 
 9. Local / County / State governmental agency (e.g. Mayor’s Criminal Justice  
  Office) 
 10. Social service provider 
 11. Community-based agency 
 12. Other (specify) _____________ 
 
 
27. Country where study was conducted: _____________________________ 
 
28. City (and state/province, if applicable) where study was conducted: _________ 
 
Methodology/Research design: 
29. Type of study: _________ 
 1. Randomized experiment 
 2. Nonequivalent control group (quasi-experimental) 
 3. Multiple time series (quasi-experimental) 
 4. Other (specify) ___________________ 
 
 62   The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
 
30. How were study units allocated to treatment or comparison conditions? 
 1. Simple random allocation 
 2. Random allocation in pairs, blocks, or some other sophisticated technique 
 3. Simple descriptive matching 
 4. Sophisticated statistical matching (e.g. propensity scores) 
  5. Other (specify) ___________________ 
 
31. Explain how independent and extraneous variables were controlled so that it was 
possible to disentangle the impact of the intervention or how threats to internal 
validity were ruled out. 
__________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
 
The following questions refer to the units receiving treatment: 
 
32. Units receiving treatment: ______ 
 1. Micro places (crime hot spots, specific housing project, etc.) 
 2. Small police-defined units (such as beats) 
 3. Larger police-defined units (such as districts or sectors) 
 4. Neighborhood or community level 
 5. City or town level 
 6. State level 
 7. Individuals 
 8. Other (specify) _____________ 
 
33. What is the exact unit receiving treatment?_________________________ 
 
The following question refers to the units not receiving treatment  
 
34. Units NOT receiving treatment: ______ 
 1. Micro places (crime hot spots, specific housing project, etc.) 
 2. Small police-defined units (such as beats) 
 3. Larger police-defined units (such as districts or sectors) 
 4. Neighborhood or community level 
 5. City or town level 
 6. State level 
 7. Individual 
 8. Other (specify) _____________ 
 
35.  What were the casual hypotheses tested in this study?__________________ 
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36. Please identify any theories from which the causal hypotheses were derived. 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Outcomes reported (Note that for each outcome, a separate coding sheet is 
required) 
 
37. How many crime / alternative outcomes are reported in the study? _____ 
38. What is the specific outcome recorded on this coding sheet?___________ 
 
39. Was it the primary outcome of the study? _______ 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 3. Can’t tell/researcher did not prioritize outcomes 
 
40. Was this initially intended as an outcome of the study? ______ 
 1. Yes 
 2. No (explain) 
 3. Can’t tell 
 
41. If no, explain why: 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Unit of analysis 
42. What was the unit of analysis for the research evaluation?   
 1. Individuals 
 2. Micro places (crime hot spots, specific housing project, etc.) 
 3. Small police-defined units (such as beats) 
 4. Larger police-defined units (such as districts or sectors) 
 5. Neighborhood or community level 
 6. City or town level 
 7. State level 
 8. Other (specify) _____________ 
 
43. How many units of analysis are there for the intervention in the study? ______ 
 
44. Did the researchers collect nested data within the unit of analysis? 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 
Dependent Variable 
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45. What type of data was used to measure the outcome covered on this coding 
sheet? ____ 
 1. Official data (from the police) 
 2. Researcher observations 
 3. Self-report surveys 
 4. Other (specify) ___________________ 
 
46. If official data was used, what specific type(s) of data were used? (Select all that 
apply) 
 1. Calls for service (911 calls)/crime reports 
 2. Arrests 
 3. Incident reports 
 4. Level of citizen complaints 
 5. Other (specify) 
 6. N/A (official data not used) 
 7. Other (specify) ___________________ 
 
47. If researcher observations were used, what types of observations were taken? 
(Select all that apply) 
 1. Physical observations (e.g. observed urban blight, such as trash, graffiti) 
 2. Social observations (e.g. observed disorder, such as loitering, public  
  drinking) 
 3. Other observations (specify) 
 4. N/A (researcher observations not used) 
 5. Other (specify) ___________________ 
 
48. If self-report surveys were used, who was surveyed? (Select all that apply) 
 1. Residents/community members 
 2. Business owners 
 3. Elected officials 
 4. Government/social service agencies 
 5. Other (specify) ___________________ 
 6. N/A (self-report surveys not used) 
 
49. Specifically identify the outcome covered on this coding sheet ____________ 
  
 
50.  For the units of analysis in this study, what time periods were examined for the 
outcome covered on this coding sheet? 
 1. Yearly 
 2. Monthly 
 3. Weekly 
 4. Other researcher defined time periods (specify) __________________ 
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51.  What was the length in time of the follow-up period after the intervention? 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
52. Did the researcher assess the quality of the data collected? 
  1. Yes 
  2. No 
 
52a. Did the researcher(s) express any concerns over the quality of the data? 
  1. Yes 
  2. No 
52b. If yes, explain_____________________________________________ 
 
53a. Does the evaluation data correspond to the initially stated problem? (i.e. if the 
problem is gang violence, does the evaluation data specifically look at whether gang 
violence changed?) 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 
53b. If no, explain the discrepancy: 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Effect size/Reports of statistical significance 
 
Dependent Measure Descriptors 
54. Statistical analysis design: _____ 
 1. Pretest comparison 
 2. Post-test comparison 
 3. Follow-up comparison 
 4. N/A 
 
Sample Size 
 
55. Based on the unit of analysis for this outcome, what is the total sample size in the 
analysis?________ 
 
56. What is the total sample size of the treatment group (group that receives the 
response)?_______ 
 
57. What is the total sample size of the control group (if applicable)? _____ 
 
58a. Was attrition a problem in the analysis for this outcome? 
 1. Yes 
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 2. No 
 
58b. If attrition was a problem, provide details (e. g. how many cases were lost and 
why were they lost). 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
59. What do the sample sizes above refer to? 
 1. Crimes 
 2. People 
 3. Geographic areas 
 4. Places 
 5. Other (specify) ________________ 
 
Effect Size Data 
60. Raw difference favors (i.e. shows more success for): 
 1. Treatment group 
 2. Control group 
 3. Neither (exactly equal) 
 9. Cannot tell (or statistically insignificant report only) 
 
 
61. Did a test of statistical significance indicate statistically significant differences 
between either the control and treatment groups or the pre and post tested 
treatment group? ____ 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 3. Can’t tell 
 4. N/A (no testing completed) 
 
62. Was a standardized effect size reported? 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 
63. If yes, what was the effect size? ______ 
 
64. If yes, page number where effect size data is found ________ 
 
65. If no, is there data available to calculate an effect size? 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 
66. Type of data effect size can be calculated from: 
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 1. Means and standard deviations 
 2. t-value or F-value 
 3. Chi-square (df=1) 
 4. Frequencies or proportions (dichotomous) 
 5. Frequencies or proportions (polychotomous) 
 6. Other (specify) _________ 
 
Means and Standard Deviations 
 
67a. Treatment group mean. _____ 
67b. Control group mean. _____ 
 
68a. Treatment group standard deviation. _____ 
68b. Control group standard deviation. _____ 
 
Proportions or frequencies 
 
69a. n of treatment group with a successful outcome. _____ 
69b. n of control group with a successful outcome. _____ 
 
70a. Proportion of treatment group with a successful outcome. _____ 
70b. Proportion of treatment group with a successful outcome. _____ 
 
Significance Tests 
 
71a. t-value _____ 
71b. F-value _____ 
71c. Chi-square value (df=1) _____ 
 
Calculated Effect Size 
 
72a. Effect size ______ 
72b. Standard error of effect size _____ 
 
Conclusions made by the author(s) 
Note that the following questions refer to conclusions about the effectiveness of the 
intervention 
in regards to the current outcome being addressed on this coding sheet. 
 
73. Conclusion about the impact of the intervention? _____ 
 1. The authors conclude problem declined 
 2. The authors conclude the problem did not decline 
 3. Unclear/no conclusion stated by authors 
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74. Did the assessment find evidence of a geographic displacement of crime? _____ 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 3. Not tested 
 
75. Did the assessment find evidence of a temporal displacement of crime? _____ 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 3. Not tested 
 
76. Did the author(s) conclude that the pulling levers intervention was beneficial? _ 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 3. Can’t tell 
 
77. Did the author(s) conclude there a relationship between the pulling levers 
intervention and a reduction in crime? _____ 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 3. Can’t tell 
 
78.  Who funded the intervention? 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
 
79. Who funded the evaluation research? 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
80. Were the researchers independent evaluators? 
 1. Yes 
 2. No 
 
80b. If no, explain the nature of the relationship: 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
 
81. Additional notes about conclusions: 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
82. Additional notes about study: 
__________________________________________________________ 
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13 Appendix C: Detailed Narrative 
Review of the Effects of Eligible 
Focused Deterrence 
Evaluations on Crime 
13.1  OPERATION CEASEFIRE IN BOSTON, 
MASSACHUSETTS  
The Boston Gun Project was a problem-oriented policing enterprise expressly aimed 
at taking on a serious, large-scale crime problem — homicide victimization among 
young people in Boston in the 1990s. The trajectory of the Boston Gun Project, and 
the resulting Operation Ceasefire intervention, is by now well known and extensively 
documented (Braga et al., 2001; Kennedy, 1997, 2006; Kennedy et al., 1996).  
Briefly, a working group of law enforcement personnel, youth workers, and Harvard 
researchers diagnosed the youth violence problem in Boston as one of patterned, 
largely vendetta-like hostility amongst a small population of chronic offenders, and 
particularly among those involved in 61 loose, informal, mostly neighborhood-based 
“gangs.” These 61 gangs consisted of some 1,300 members, representing less than 1 
percent of the city’s youth between the ages of 14 and 24. Although small in number, 
these gangs were responsible for more than 60 percent of youth homicide in Boston.  
The Operation Ceasefire focused deterrence strategy was designed to prevent 
violence by reaching out directly to gangs, saying explicitly that violence would no 
longer be tolerated, and backing up that message by “pulling every lever” legally 
available when violence occurred (Kennedy, 1997). The chronic involvement of gang 
members in a wide variety of offenses made them, and the gangs they formed, 
vulnerable to a coordinated criminal justice response. The authorities could disrupt 
street drug activity, focus police attention on low-level street crimes such as 
trespassing and public drinking, serve outstanding warrants, cultivate confidential 
informants for medium- and long-term investigations of gang activities, deliver 
strict probation and parole enforcement, seize drug proceeds and other assets, 
ensure stiffer plea bargains and sterner prosecutorial attention, request stronger bail 
terms (and enforce them), and bring potentially severe federal investigative and 
prosecutorial attention to gang-related drug and gun activity.  Simultaneously, youth 
workers, probation and parole officers, and later churches and other community 
groups offered gang members services and other kinds of help.    
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These partners also delivered an explicit message that violence was unacceptable to 
the community and that “street” justifications for violence were mistaken.  The 
Ceasefire Working Group delivered this message in formal meetings with gang 
members (known as “forums” or “call-ins”), through individual police and probation 
contacts with gang members, through meetings with inmates at secure juvenile 
facilities in the city, and through gang outreach workers. The deterrence message 
was not a deal with gang members to stop violence. Rather, it was a promise to gang 
members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response. If 
gangs committed other crimes but refrained from violence, the normal workings of 
police, prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal justice system dealt with these 
matters. But if gang members hurt people, the Working Group concentrated its 
enforcement actions on their gangs. 
The Ceasefire “crackdowns” were not designed to eliminate gangs or stop every 
aspect of gang activity, but to control and deter serious violence. To do this, the 
Working Group explained its actions against targeted gangs to other gangs, as in 
“this gang did violence, we responded with the following actions, and here is how to 
prevent anything similar from happening to you.” The ongoing Working Group 
process regularly watched the city for outbreaks of gang violence and framed any 
necessary responses in accord with the Ceasefire strategy. As the strategy unfolded, 
the Working Group continued communication with gangs and gang members to 
convey its determination to stop violence, to explain its actions to the target 
population, and to maximize both voluntary compliance and the strategy’s deterrent 
power. 
The DOJ-sponsored evaluation of the impact of Operation Ceasefire used a 
nonrandomized quasi-experimental design to compare youth homicide trends in 
Boston to youth homicide trends in other major cities in the United States and large 
New England cities (Braga et al., 2001).11
The Ceasefire evaluation concluded that the program was associated with 
statistically significant reductions in youth homicide and the other indicators of 
  The key outcome variable was the monthly 
number of homicide victims ages 24 and under between January 1, 1991 and May 31, 
1998.  The within-Boston program impact assessment was supplemented by 
analyses of Ceasefire’s effect on the monthly number of citywide gun assault 
incidents, citywide shots-fired calls for service, and youth gun assault incidents in 
one high-risk policing district.  Poisson and negative binomial regression models, 
controlling for secular trends, seasonal variations, Boston youth population trends, 
Boston employment rate trends, robbery trends, adult homicide trends, and youth 
drug arrest trends, were used to estimate the effect of Ceasefire on the outcome 
variables.  The impact of Ceasefire was estimated using a dummy variable with June 
1996 selected as the commencement of the post-implementation period. 
 
11 The Braga and Pierce (2005) evaluation of the effects of Operation Ceasefire on illegal gun market 
dynamics in Boston was not included in this review as it did not examine the effects of a pulling levers 
strategy on crime outcomes. 
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serious gun violence in Boston. Controlling for the other covariates, the evaluation 
reported that Ceasefire was associated with a 63 percent reduction in the monthly 
count of youth homicides, a 25 percent reduction in the monthly count of citywide 
gun assault incidents, a 32 percent reduction in the monthly count of citywide shots-
fired calls for service, and a 44 percent reduction in the monthly count of youth gun 
assaults in selected high-risk district (Braga et al., 2001; see also Piehl et al., 2000).  
In a companion paper, Piehl et al. (2003) closely analyzed the monthly counts in the 
youth homicide time series to determine whether the timing of the implementation 
of Ceasefire coincided with the start of the significant decrease in Boston youth 
homicides. The authors developed an econometric model that evaluated all possible 
monthly break points in the time series to identify the maximal monthly break point 
associated with a significant structural change in the trajectory of the time series. 
Controlling for trends and seasonal variations, the timing of the “optimal break” in 
the time series was in the summer months after Ceasefire was implemented. 
The DOJ-sponsored evaluation then conducted a comparative analysis of youth 
homicide trends in 39 of the most populous cities in the United States and 29 New 
England cities with populations of more than 60,000 residents (Braga et al., 2001).  
Using count regression models that controlled for trends, seasonal variations, and 
serial autocorrelation, the research found that only three cities (Dallas, TX; 
Jacksonville, FL; and Virginia Beach, VA) had significant reductions in the monthly 
count of youth homicides that coincided with the implementation of Ceasefire in 
Boston and an additional four cities (Los Angeles, CA; New York City, NY; 
Philadelphia, PA; and Tucson, AZ) had significant reductions in the monthly count 
of youth homicides at some point within the time series.  Further examination of the 
youth homicide trends in these cities, however, revealed trajectories that looked 
distinct from the trajectory of Boston youth homicide over the same time period.  As 
such, the researchers concluded that Boston’s youth homicide reduction associated 
with Operation Ceasefire was distinct when compared to trends in most major U.S. 
cities. 
The DOJ evaluation has been reviewed by a number of researchers and the 
relationship between the implementation of Ceasefire and the trajectory youth 
homicide in Boston during the 1990s has been closely scrutinized.  Fagan (2002) 
suggested that some of the decrease in homicide may have occurred without the 
Ceasefire intervention in place as violence was decreasing in most major U.S. cities.  
In support of this perspective, Fagan’s (2002) presented a simple time-series graph 
on youth gun homicide in Boston and in other Massachusetts cities that suggested a 
general downward trend in gun violence may have existed before Operation 
Ceasefire was implemented. Using growth-curve analysis to examine predicted 
homicide trend data for the 95 largest U.S. cities during the 1990s, Rosenfeld and 
his colleagues (2005) found some evidence of a sharper youth homicide drop in 
Boston than elsewhere but suggest that the small number of youth homicide 
incidents precludes strong conclusions about program effectiveness based on their 
statistical models. However, in his review of their analysis, Richard Berk (2005) 
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raised a number of statistical and methodological concerns with the analysis 
developed by Rosenfeld and his colleagues.  Ludwig (2005) suggested that Ceasefire 
was associated with a large drop in youth homicide but, given the complexities of 
analyzing city-level homicide trend data, there remained some uncertainty about the 
extent of Ceasefire’s effect on youth violence in Boston.  Morgan and Winship’s 
(2007) review of the DOJ evaluation concluded that the analysis was a “very high-
quality example” of how to conduct an interrupted time series analysis of program 
impact and further noted “they offer four types of supplemental analysis… which can 
be used to strengthen the warrant for causal assertion” (252). 
The National Academies’ Panel on Improving Information and Data on Firearms 
(Wellford et al., 2005) concluded that the Ceasefire evaluation was compelling in 
associating the intervention with the subsequent decline in youth homicide. 
However, the Panel also suggested that many complex factors affect youth homicide 
trends and it was difficult to specify the exact relationship between the Ceasefire 
intervention and subsequent changes in youth offending behaviors.  While the DOJ-
sponsored evaluation controlled for existing violence trends and certain rival causal 
factors such as changes in the youth population, drug markets, and employment in 
Boston, there could be complex interaction effects among these factors not 
measured by the evaluation that could account for some meaningful portion of the 
decrease.  The evaluation was not a randomized, controlled experiment.  Therefore, 
the non-randomized control group research design cannot rule out these internal 
threats to the conclusion that Ceasefire was the key factor in the youth homicide 
decline.   
13.2  INDIANAPOLIS VIOLENCE REDUCTION PARTNERSHIP 
IN INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 
The Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership (IVRP) working group was 
comprised of Indiana University researchers and federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies (McGarrell and Chermak, 2003).  During the problem 
analysis phase, the researchers examined 258 homicides from 1997 and the first 8 
months of 1998 and found that a majority of homicide victims (63%) and offenders 
(75%) had criminal and/or juvenile records.  Those with a prior record often had a 
substantial number of arrests.  The working group members followed the structured 
qualitative data gathering exercises used in Boston to gain insight on the nature of 
homicide incidents.  The qualitative exercise revealed that 59% of the incidents 
involved “groups of known chronic offenders” and 53% involved drug-related 
motives such as settling business and turf disputes (McGarrell and Chermak, 2003).  
It is worth noting that the terminology “groups of known chronic offenders” was 
initially used because, at that point in time, there was not a consensual definition of 
“gang” and the reality of much gang activity in Indianapolis was of a relatively loose 
structure (McGarrell and Chermak, 2003). 
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The working group developed two sets of overlapping strategies.  First, the most 
violent chronic offenders in Indianapolis were identified and targeted for heightened 
arrest, prosecution, and incarceration (McGarrell and Chermak, 2003).  Second, the 
working group engaged the pulling levers approach to reduce violent behavior by 
gangs and groups of known chronic offenders (McGarrell and Chermak, 2003).  The 
IVRP strategy implemented by the Indianapolis working group closely resembled 
the Boston version of pulling levers.  The communications strategy, however, 
differed in an important way.  The deterrence and social services message was 
delivered in meetings with high-risk probationers and parolees organized by 
neighborhoods.  Similarly, home visits by probation and parolees were generally 
organized by neighborhood.  As the project progressed, when a homicide or series of 
homicides involved certain groups or gangs, the working group attempted to target 
meetings, enforcement activities, and home visits on the involved groups or gangs 
(McGarrell and Chermak, 2003). 
The evaluation of the IVRP gang violence reduction strategy used a nonrandomized 
quasi-experimental design to compare homicide incident trends in Indianapolis to 
homicide incident trends in six Midwestern cities (McGarrell et al. 2006).  The six 
comparison cities included Cincinnati (OH), Cleveland (OH), Columbus (OH), 
Kansas City (MO), Louisville (KY), and Pittsburgh (PA).  For all seven cities, the key 
outcome variable was the monthly number of homicide incidents between January 1, 
1997 and June 30, 2001.  The evaluation used Auto Regressive Integrated Moving 
Average (ARIMA) models to analyze the city time series data. 
The impact of the IVRP strategy was estimated using a dummy variable with April 
1999 selected as the commencement of the post-intervention period (McGarrell et 
al., 2006).  The ARIMA analyses of the Indianapolis homicide time series estimated 
that the IVRP intervention was associated with a statistically significant 34 percent 
reduction in monthly numbers of homicides.  The ARIMA models analyzing the 
other cities’ homicide time series did not report any statistically significant 
associations between the timing of IVRP and subsequent decreases in monthly 
homicide numbers.  In a subsequent analysis of Indianapolis homicide time series 
data, Corsaro and McGarrell (2009) used ARIMA models to analyze the impact of 
IVRP on gang and non-gang homicides.  The analyses found a statistically 
significant 38 percent reduction in gang homicides following the implementation of 
IVRP and did not find a statistically significant reduction in the non-gang homicides 
during the post-intervention time period.  Since IVRP was explicitly designed to 
reduce gang violence, the authors concluded that these results support the position 
that the intervention was indeed having the desired effects on violent gang 
offending. 
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13.3  OPERATION PEACEKEEPER IN STOCKTON, 
CALIFORNIA 
Beginning in mid-1997, criminal justice agencies in Stockton began experimenting 
with the pulling levers approach to address a sudden increase in youth homicide.  
The Stockton Police Department and other local, state, and federal law enforcement 
agencies believed that most of the youth violence problem was driven by gang 
conflicts and that the pulling levers approached used in Boston might be effective in 
reducing Stockton’s gang violence problem.  The strategy was implemented by the 
Stockton Police Department’s Gang Street Enforcement Team and grew into what is 
now known as “Operation Peacekeeper” as more agencies joined the partnership 
(Wakeling, 2003).   
The Peacekeeper intervention was managed by a working group of line-level 
criminal justice practitioners; social service providers also participated in the 
working group process as appropriate.  When street gang violence erupted or when 
it came to the attention of a working group member that gang violence was 
imminent, the working group followed the Boston model by sending a direct 
message that gang violence would not be tolerated, pulling all available enforcement 
levers to prevent violence, continuing communications, and providing social services 
and opportunities to gang members who want them. 
The Operation Peacekeeper evaluation used a nonrandomized quasi-experimental 
design to compare gun homicide trends in Stockton to gun homicide trends in eight 
other midsized California cities (Braga, 2008b).  The eight comparison California 
cities included Anaheim, Bakersfield, Fresno, Long Beach, Oakland, Riverside, 
Sacramento, and Santa Ana.  For each of the nine cities included in the evaluation, 
the key outcome variable was the monthly number of gun homicide victims between 
January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2005.  The evaluation carefully analyzed the 
distributions of the dependent variables for each city’s time series to determine the 
appropriate regression models for the impact assessment.  Ordinary Least Squares 
(Santa Ana), maximum likelihood with an AR(1) autoregressive component (Long 
Beach, Oakland), negative binomial (Anaheim, Bakersfield, Fresno, Riverside, 
Stockton), and Poisson (Sacramento) regression models were used to analyze the 
city time series data. 
Stockton’s Operation Peacekeeper intervention was implemented in September 1997 
and was operational until it was discontinued in December 2002 (Braga, 2008b). 
Multiple category dummy variables indicating the time periods when the Stockton 
Peacekeeper intervention was present or not were included in the regression models 
to estimate the trajectory of the monthly counts of gun homicide in each of the time 
series after Stockton implemented its gun violence reduction initiative.  Controlling 
for existing linear and non-linear trends, seasonal variations, and violent crime 
trends, the negative binomial regression analyzing the Stockton gun homicide time 
series estimated that the intervention was associated with a statistically significant 
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42 percent reduction in the monthly count of gun homicides. None of the 
comparison cities experienced a statistically significant reduction in the monthly 
count of gun homicides that coincided with the implementation of the Peacekeeper 
intervention in Stockton.   
13.4  PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS IN LOWELL, 
MASSACHUSETTS 
Supported by funds from the U.S. Department of Justice-sponsored Project Safe 
Neighborhoods initiative, an interagency task force implemented a pulling levers 
focused deterrence strategy to prevent gun violence among Hispanic and Asian 
gangs in Lowell, Massachusetts in 2002 (Braga, McDevitt, and Pierce, 2006).  The 
Lowell authorities used a pulling levers focused deterrence strategy that replicated 
Boston’s Operation Ceasefire to prevent violence among Hispanic gangs.  However, 
from the outset, they felt much less confident about their ability to prevent Asian 
gang violence by applying the same set of criminal justice levers to Asian gang 
members. During the intervention time period, the Lowell Police Department (LPD) 
had little reliable intelligence about Asian gangs in the city (Braga et al., 2006). The 
LPD had attempted to develop informants in the past but most these efforts had 
been unsuccessful.  
Through PSN, the LPD increased its efforts to develop intelligence about the 
structure of the city’s Asian gangs and particularly the relationship between Asian 
gang violence and ongoing illegal gambling that was being run by local Asian 
businesses.  In Lowell, Cambodian and Laotian gangs were comprised of youth 
whose street activities were influenced by “elders” of the gang (Braga et al., 2006).  
Elders were generally long-time gang members in their 30s and 40s that no longer 
engaged in illegal activities on the street or participated in street-level violence with 
rival youth.  Rather, these older gang members were heavily involved in running 
illegal gambling dens and informal casinos that were operated out of cafes, video 
stores, and warehouses located in the poor Asian neighborhoods of Lowell.  The 
elders used young street gang members to protect their business interests and to 
collect any unpaid gambling debts.  Illegal gaming was a very lucrative business that 
was much more important to the elders than any ongoing beefs the youth in their 
gang had with other youth (Braga et al., 2006).  In contrast to acquiring information 
on individuals responsible for gun crimes in Asian communities, it was much easier 
to detect the presence of gambling operations through surveillance or a simple visit 
to the suspected business establishment. 
The importance of illegal gaming to influential members of Asian street gangs 
provided a potentially potent lever to law enforcement in preventing violence.  The 
authorities in Lowell believed that they could systematically prevent street violence 
among gangs by targeting the gambling interests of older members.  When a street 
gang was violent, the LPD targeted the gambling businesses run by the older 
members of the gang.  The enforcement activities ranged from serving a search 
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warrant on the business that houses the illegal enterprise and making arrests to 
simply placing a patrol car in front of the suspected gambling location to deter 
gamblers from entering.  The LPD coupled these tactics with the delivery of a clear 
message, “when the gang kids associated with you act violently, we will shut down 
your gambling business. When violence erupts, no one makes money” (Braga et al., 
2006: 40).   Between October 2002 and June 2003, the height of the focused 
attention on Asian gangs, the LPD conducted some 30 search warrants on illegal 
gambling dens that resulted in more than 100 gambling-related arrests (Braga et al., 
2006). 
The evaluation of the PSN gang violence reduction strategy used a nonrandomized 
quasi-experimental design to compare fatal and non-fatal gun assault incident 
trends in Lowell to fatal and non-fatal gun assault incident trends in seven other 
Massachusetts cities and the entire State of Massachusetts (Braga et al., 2008).  The 
seven comparison Massachusetts cities included Boston, Brockton, Fall River, Lynn, 
New Bedford, Springfield, and Worcester.  For the State of Massachusetts and the 
eight cities included in the evaluation, the key outcome variable was the monthly 
number of gun assault incidents between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2005.  
The evaluation carefully analyzed the distributions of the dependent variables for 
each time series to determine the appropriate regression models for the impact 
assessment.  Maximum likelihood with an AR(1) autoregressive component (Boston, 
Springfield, and State of Massachusetts), negative binomial (Brockton, Lynn, New 
Bedford, Worcester), and Poisson (Lowell, Fall River) regression models were used 
to analyze the city time series data. 
The impact of Lowell’s PSN strategy was estimated using a dummy variable with 
October 2002 selected as the commencement of the post-intervention period (Braga 
et al., 2008).  Controlling for existing linear and non-linear trends, seasonal 
variations, population changes, and violent crime trends, the Poisson regression 
model reported that the Lowell PSN intervention was associated with a statistically 
significant 44 percent reduction in the monthly count of gun assault incidents. 
Neither the comparison cities nor the State of Massachusetts experienced a 
statistically significant reduction in the monthly count of gun homicides that 
coincided with the implementation of the PSN intervention in Lowell.  
13.5  CINCINNATI INITIATIVE TO REDUCE VIOLENCE IN 
CINCINNATI, OHIO 
In response to a disturbing increase in homicides between 2001 and 2006, 
Cincinnati’s political leadership partnered with law enforcement officials, 
academics, medical professionals, street advocates, and community and business 
leaders, to form the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV; Engel et al., 
2010). Problem analyses suggested that violent street groups of active criminal 
offenders generated the bulk of homicides and shootings in Cincinnati.  As described 
by Engel et al. (2010), Cincinnati implemented a group violence reduction strategy 
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that was modeled after the pulling levers focused deterrence strategy implemented 
in Boston and included law enforcement consequences for violence, along with 
social service opportunities and community engagement. In face-to-face offender 
notification meetings, police, community activists, political figures, civil rights 
activists, ex-offenders, parents of murdered children, social service providers, 
medical personnel, and business, civic and religious leaders told members of violent 
groups that the violence must stop, that there would be law enforcement 
consequences for the entire group if it did not, and that the community would 
support these consequences (Engel et al., 2010). The working group partners also 
told violent group members that there was social service help for all who wanted it. 
 In series of unpublished reports, researchers from the Policing Institute at the 
University of Cincinnati completed ongoing preliminary evaluations of the impact of 
the CIRV interventions (Engel et al. 2008; Engel et al., 2009; Engel et al., 2010).  
The CIRV intervention was implemented in July 2007; members of criminally-active 
street groups in Cincinnati were the target population for the pulling levers focused 
deterrence strategy.  The research team used Poisson regression models controlling 
for trends and month seasonal variations to estimate the effects of the CIRV 
treatment on monthly counts of group-member-involved (GMI) homicides in 
Cincinnati.  As a comparison, they also ran the same Poisson model on non-GMI 
homicides in Cincinnati.  The authors also used a similar negative binomial 
regression model to examine the CIRV on total shootings in Cincinnati.  The 
citywide shooting data were not further parsed to conduct a comparative analysis of 
GMI and non-GMI shootings over time.  Using a dummy variable to indicate the 
presence or absence of the CIRV treatment, the pre-intervention period comprised 
January 2004 through June 2007 and the post-intervention period comprised July 
2007 through July 2010. 
These analyses revealed that the CIRV strategy was associated with a statistically 
significant 35 percent reduction in the monthly count of GMI homicides between the 
pre-intervention and post-intervention time periods (p<.10).  Non-GMI homicides 
experienced a non-statistically significant 35 percent increase between the pre-
intervention and post-intervention time periods.  The analyses also revealed a 
statistically significant 21 percent reduction (p<.05) in the monthly count of citywide 
total shootings associated with the implementation of the CIRV strategy. 
13.6  OPERATION CEASEFIRE IN NEWARK, NEW JERSEY 
In an unpublished report, researchers from the Violence Institute of New Jersey at 
the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ) evaluated the 
Operation Ceasefire gang violence strategy in Newark, New Jersey (Boyle et al., 
2010).  The Newark Ceasefire strategy focused on preventing gun violence by 
individual gang members in a targeted “Ceasefire Zone.”  According to Boyle et al. 
(2010), the Newark strategy blended the law enforcement actions developed by the 
Boston Ceasefire pulling levers strategy (Kennedy et al., 1996) with the public health 
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violence prevention activities developed by CeaseFire Chicago (Skogan et al., 2008). 
Shooting teams of detectives from the Newark, Irvington, and New Jersey State 
police departments aggressively investigated fatal and non-fatal shootings in the 
Ceasefire Zone.  Parole officers also closely monitored high-risk individuals in the 
targeted area.   
Drawing on the Chicago approach, Newark Ceasefire addressed risk and protective 
factors for individual gang members through five program components: public 
education, community mobilization, faith-based leader involvement, youth 
outreach, and criminal justice system engagement. Ceasefire youth outreach workers 
attempted to change the way gang members thought about and reacted to violence 
and to connect them with available services and opportunities.  While there were not 
any formal offender-notification strategies in place, the participating law 
enforcement agencies, community groups, and outreach workers actively 
communicated with individual gang members to prevent retaliatory shootings and 
disrupt ongoing conflicts. 
The Ceasefire Zone was a roughly two-square mile section of Newark that 
experienced elevated levels of gun homicides and shooting incidents.  The Newark 
Ceasefire intervention was implemented on May 11, 2005.  The evaluation team used 
ARIMA models to examine non-fatal gunshot wound trends in the Ceasefire Zone, a 
comparison zone, and the remainder of the City of Newark minus the Ceasefire Zone 
(Boyle et al., 2010).  The comparison zone was identified through spatial analyses of 
non-fatal gunshot wounds to identify an area of similar size with similar levels of 
gun violence in Newark and also matched to the Ceasefire Zone based on 2000 
Census data on the number of block groups in each area, population, resident race 
and ethnicity, median resident age and household income, concentrated poverty, 
and vacant housing units. 
In the Newark Ceasefire evaluation, the key outcome variable was the weekly 
number of non-fatal gunshot wound victims treated at the Trauma Center at 
University Hospital in Newark in the Ceasefire Zone, comparison zone, and 
remainder of Newark between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2006 (Boyle et al., 
2010).  These victimizations were geocoded by the location of gunshot wounding 
and then aggregated into weekly counts in the larger areas in which the events were 
contained.  The ARIMA model estimated that the Newark Ceasefire intervention was 
associated with a non-statistically significant decrease in the weekly number of non-
fatal gunshot wound victims in the Ceasefire Zone.  The comparison zone also 
experienced a smaller, non-significant decrease in the weekly number of non-fatal 
gunshot victims and the remainder of Newark experienced a non-significant 
increase in the weekly number of non-fatal gunshot victims.  As such, the evaluators 
concluded that Newark Ceasefire was not associated with any significant reductions 
in non-fatal gunshot wounds. 
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The researchers also used crime mapping software to examine potential crime 
displacement and diffusion effects in the areas immediately surrounding the 
Ceasefire Zone.  While the researchers noted changes in the spatial distributions of 
non-fatal gunshot woundings in the areas surrounding the Ceasefire Zone, they 
concluded that their analyses could not link the development of new gun violence 
hot spots and “cold spots” to displacement and/or diffusion processes associated 
with the Ceasefire intervention. 
13.7  OPERATION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES, 
CALIFORNIA 
In March 1998, NIJ funded the RAND Corporation to develop and test strategies for 
reducing gun violence among youth in Los Angeles.  In part, the goal was to 
determine which parts of the Boston Gun Project might be replicable in Los Angeles.  
In designing the replication, RAND drew a clear distinction between the process 
governing the design and implementation of the strategy (data-driven policy 
development; problem solving, working groups) and the elements and design 
(pulling levers, collective accountability, retailing the message) of the Boston model.  
Processes, in theory, can be sustained and adaptive, and as such can be utilized to 
address dynamic problems.   By singling out process as an important component, 
the RAND team hoped to make clear that process can affect program effectiveness 
independently of the program elements or the merits of the actual design (see Tita, 
Riley, and Greenwood, 2003).  
The Los Angeles replication was unique in several important ways.  First, the 
implementation was not citywide, but only within a single neighborhood (Boyle 
Heights) within a single Los Angeles Police Department Division (Hollenbeck). The 
project site, Boyle Heights, had a population that was relatively homogenous.  Well 
over 80% of the residents were Latinos of Mexican origin.  The same was true for the 
gangs, many of which were formed prior to the Second World War.  These gangs 
were clearly “traditional” gangs, with memberships exceeding a hundred members 
or more.  The gangs were strongly territorial, contain age-graded sub-structures, and 
are inter-generational in nature (Tita, Riley, and Greenwood, 2003). 
Unlike other cities where gang and group-involved violence was a rather recent 
phenomenon, Los Angeles represented an attempt to reduce gun violence in a 
“chronic gang city” with a long history of gang violence, and equally long history of 
gang reduction strategies. The research team had to first convince members of the 
local criminal justice and at large community that the approach we were espousing 
differed in important ways from these previous efforts to combat gangs.  And in fact 
it does – the RAND project was not about “doing something about gangs,” but rather 
“doing something about gun violence” in a community where gang members 
committed an overwhelming proportion of gun violence.  The independent analysis 
of homicide files confirmed the perception held by police and community alike that 
gangs were highly over-represented in homicidal acts. From 1995-1998, 50% of all 
 80   The Campbell Collaboration | www.campbellcollaboration.org 
 
homicides had a clear gang motivation. Another 25% of the homicides could be 
coded as “gang related” because they involved a gang member as a victim or 
offender, but were motivated for reasons other than gang rivalries.  
Given the social organization of violence in Boyle Heights, the multi-disciplinary 
working group fully embraced the pulling levers focused deterrence strategy 
developed in Boston.  A high-profile gang shooting that resulted in a double 
homicide in Boyle Heights triggered the implementation of the Operation Ceasefire 
intervention in October 2000.  The processes of retailing the message were formally 
adopted, though it was mostly accomplished through personal contact rather than in 
a group setting.  Police, probation, community advocates, street gang workers, a 
local hospital and local clergy were all passing along the message of collective 
accountability for gangs continuing to commit gang violence. Unfortunately, Tita, 
Riley, Ridgeway et al. (2003) reported that the Los Angeles pulling levers 
intervention was not fully implemented as planned.  The implementation of the 
Ceasefire program in the Boyle Heights was negatively affected by the well-known 
Ramparts LAPD police corruption scandal and a lack of ownership of the 
intervention by the participating agencies.   
Despite the implementation difficulties, the RAND Corporation evaluated the 
Operation Ceasefire pulling levers strategy to reduce gun violence among gangs in 
the Boyle Heights area of Los Angeles (Tita et al., 2003).  In their evaluation, RAND 
researchers examined the effects of the pulling levers gang violence reduction 
strategy on violent crime (homicides, attempted homicides, robberies, assaults, and 
kidnappings), “gang crime” (violent crime and terrorist threats, firearm discharge, 
vandalism, and graffiti committed by gang members), and gun crime (any of the 
above crimes that involved use of a firearm).   
The RAND evaluation analyzed changes in their key outcome variables for three 
time periods across three comparison areas (Tita et al., 2003). The three time 
periods were the six months prior to the triggering event—the pre-intervention 
period; the four months in which all parts of the intervention were applied—the 
suppression period; and the two months in which only selected parts of the 
intervention were applied, such as heightened patrol of public housing units in the 
area and greater enforcement of probation and parole regulations—the deterrence 
period. The three comparison areas were (1) Boyle Heights compared with the 
remainder of the Hollenbeck area, (2) the five police reporting districts where the 
intervention was targeted compared with the remainder of Boyle Heights, and (3) 
the Census block groups comprising the turf of the targeted gangs compared with a 
group of Census block groups scattered throughout Hollenbeck that most closely 
matched the characteristics of the targeted area based on a propensity score 
analysis. In explaining the rationale for their research design, the RAND researchers 
reported:  
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A reduction in crime in the treatment areas greater than those in the 
comparison areas during the suppression period would help show the effects 
of all measures combined, whereas continuing reductions in the deterrence 
period would suggest that the intervention may have had some long-term 
effects in changing behavior, or that short-term application of some 
resources can produce a long-term deterrence effect (although we recognize 
our measure of deterrence is confounded by the continuation of some 
suppression activities). (Tita et al., 2003: 24 – 25). 
The evaluation used a variety of approaches to detect the effects of the Ceasefire 
intervention across the study time period (Tita et al., 2003).  The RAND researchers 
used Bayesian analyses of the count-based distributions of the outcome variables 
across these time periods in Boyle Heights relative to the remainder of Hollenbeck 
comparison and in the five targeted reporting districts relative to the remainder of 
Boyle Heights comparison.  In their analyses of targeted Census block groups 
relative to matched comparison Census block groups, the RAND researchers used 
Probit and step-wise linear regression models to define the matched comparison 
Census block groups. They then used a slightly more rigorous version of the 
“difference in differences” approach that assumed the level of crime followed a 
Poisson distribution and considered serial time trends to evaluate the effects of the 
Ceasefire intervention across these time periods (Tita et al., 2003).   
Their statistical analyses revealed that gang crime in Boyle Heights decreased 
significantly compared with other regions of Hollenbeck during the suppression 
period of the intervention, and violent, gang, and gun crime all decreased 
significantly in the deterrence period. The analyses suggested that the significant 
reduction in gang crime may have begun in the suppression period.  Violent crime, 
however, did not decrease significantly in the suppression period. In the five 
targeted police reporting districts, violent crime decreased significantly in 
comparison with the rest of Boyle Heights in the suppression and the deterrence 
periods, and gang crime decreased significantly in the suppression period. Neither 
gang crime in the deterrence period nor gun crime in the deterrence or suppression 
periods decreased significantly in comparison with the remainder of Boyle Heights.  
The RAND evaluation also reported that, in the Census block groups overlapping the 
targeted reporting districts, violent crime decreased significantly compared with the 
matched blocks (Tita et al., 2003). Their analyses also suggested that some of this 
significant reduction may have persisted into the deterrence period.  
In addition to their analyses of the main effects of the intervention, RAND 
researchers examined the effects of the intervention on neighboring areas and 
gangs. Their analyses suggested a strong diffusion of violence prevention benefits 
emanating from the targeted areas and targeted gangs (Tita et al., 2003).  In the six 
months after the intervention, the researchers reported in the 6 targeted Census 
block groups that violent crime had decreased by 34 percent, gang crime decreased 
by 28 percent, and gun crime decreased by 26 percent.  In the 11 Census block 
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groups immediately surrounding the targeted block groups, violent crime had 
decreased by 33 percent, gang crime decreased by 44 percent, and gun crime 
decreased by 28 percent.  The RAND research team also examined gang crime by 
gangs not targeted by the Ceasefire intervention that were “socially tied” through 
conflicts and alliances to the target gangs. After the Ceasefire intervention was 
implemented, gang crimes committed by the targeted gangs and the non-targeted, 
socially-tied gangs decreased by a matching 26 percent. 
13.8  PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS IN CHICAGO, 
ILLINOIS 
 The PSN was implemented in two adjacent police districts in Chicago’s West Side 
where rates of murder and gun violence were more than four times higher than the 
city average in 2002.  As described by Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan (2007), the 
PSN team reasoned that the best way to address Chicago’s homicide and gun 
violence problem was to craft intervention strategies focused on the population with 
a very high risk of being a victim or offender of gun violence in the targeted 
neighborhoods. Two principles guided the design and development of PSN 
interventions: (1) that enforcement efforts be highly specified and targeted to those 
most at risk of being a victim and offender of gun violence, and (2) that serious 
efforts should be directed towards changing the normative side of gun violence, i.e., 
the reasons young men use guns and their attitudes towards the law and law 
enforcers. Following these principles the PSN team devised several law enforcement, 
community outreach, and offender notification forums and follow-up re-entry 
programs. The PSN interventions were implemented in May 2002. 
A quasi-experimental design was used to evaluate the impact of the various PSN 
programs on neighborhood-level homicide rates in Chicago (Papachristos et al., 
2007). As described, two adjacent police districts were nonrandomly selected from 
the city’s 25 police districts as PSN treatment districts and, via propensity score 
matching procedures, two other police districts selected as near-equivalent controls.  
Monthly and quarterly counts of homicide incidents between January 1999 and 
December 2004 were identified as the key outcome variables (Papachristos et al., 
2007; Meares et al., 2009); however, the evaluation also analyzed monthly and 
quarterly counts of gun homicide incidents, gang homicide incidents, and 
aggravated assault incidents in the treatment districts relative to the control 
districts. 
The research team analyzed the overall effects of the PSN treatment as well as the 
four interventions that comprised the PSN treatment: (1) increased federal 
prosecutions for convicted felons carrying or using guns, (2) the length of sentences 
associated with federal prosecutions, (3) supply-side firearm policing activities (gun 
recoveries by ATF-CPD gun teams), and (4) social marketing of deterrence and 
social norms messages through justice-style offender notification meetings. In these 
offender notification meetings, randomly selected gun- and gang-involved recently-
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released former prison inmates returning to the treatment districts were informed of 
their vulnerability as felons to federal firearms laws, with stiff mandatory minimum 
sentences; offered social services; and addressed by community members and ex-
offenders.  Using individual growth curve regression models, the research team 
found that the PSN treatment was associated with a statistically significant 37 
percent reduction in the number of homicides in the treatment district relative to 
the control districts.   The overall PSN treatment was also associated with 
statistically significant decreases in gun homicide incidents and aggravated assault 
incidents, and a non-statistically significant decrease in gang homicide incidents. 
The PSN intervention that generated the largest, statistically significant effect on 
decreased homicide in the treatment districts relative to control districts was the 
offender notification forums. In short, the greater the proportion of offenders who 
attended the forums, the greater the decline in treatment district levels of homicide. 
Increased federal prosecutions and the number of guns recovered by the gun teams 
were associated with modest but statistically significant declines in homicides in the 
treatment districts relative to the control districts.  Getting more guns off the street 
and prosecuting more offenders federally for gun crimes were associated with small 
but meaningful homicide decreases.  The length of sentences associated with federal 
prosecutions was not associated with the observed homicide decreases. 
In a supplemental unpublished analysis, Fagan et al. (2008) analyzed recidivism 
rates of individuals who participated in the PSN notification forums. Using survival 
analyses, the authors found that those who attended a PSN forum were 30 percent 
less likely to be rearrested relative to a comparison group of similar recently-
released individuals from the same neighborhood.  The program diminished 
recidivism levels for both gang and non-gang members and seemed to be 
particularly effective for individuals who had only one prior felony conviction. 
13.9  DRUG MARKET INTERVENTION IN NASHVILLE, 
TENNESSEE 
In an unpublished report, Corsaro and McGarrell (2009) evaluated the impact of a 
pulling levers focused deterrence strategy to reduce crime and disorder problems 
associated with an illegal drug market operating in the McFerrin Park neighborhood 
of Nashville, Tennessee.  Drawing on similar intervention conducted in High Point, 
North Carolina (Kennedy, 2009), the project employed a joint police-community 
partnership to identify individual offenders, notify them of the consequences of 
continued dealing, provide supportive services through a community-based resource 
coordinator, and convey an uncompromising community norm against drug dealing. 
This application of focused deterrence is generally referred to as the “Drug Market 
Intervention” (DMI) strategy.   
The DMI seeks to shut down overt drug markets entirely (Kennedy, 2009). 
Enforcement powers are used strategically and sparingly, employing arrest and 
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prosecution only against violent offenders and when nonviolent offenders have 
resisted all efforts to get them to desist and to provide them with help.  Through the 
use of “banked” cases,12
The strategy was implemented in March 2008 and the evaluation examined 
outcome data for the March 2005 through April 2009 time period. The evaluation 
measured the effects of the DMI intervention on five outcome variables: violent 
crime (the aggregated number of homicide, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault incidents), property crime (the sum of burglaries, larcenies, and motor 
vehicle thefts), illegal drug possession offenses, drug equipment offenses (the 
monthly number of charges for drug-paraphernalia and related crimes), and total 
calls for service. The researchers analyzed the aggregated monthly number of these 
outcome variables for the following Nashville areas: 1) the McFerrin Park target 
neighborhood to assess the local effect; 2) adjoining, contagious areas to the 
McFerrin Park neighborhood to assess whether a local displacement or a diffusion of 
benefits occurred; and 3) the remainder of Davidson County, once the target and 
adjoining areas were subtracted from the county totals for general trend comparison 
purposes.  
 the strategy makes the promise of law enforcement 
sanctions against dealers extremely direct and credible, so that dealers are in no 
doubt concerning the consequences of offending and have good reason to change 
their behavior.  The strategy also brings powerful informal social control to bear on 
dealers from immediate family and community figures.  The strategy organizes and 
focuses services, help, and support on dealers so that those who are willing have 
what they need to change their lives.  Each operation also includes a maintenance 
strategy. 
ARIMA models with a dummy variable to represent the implementation of the DMI 
strategy were used to analyze trends in the treatment, adjoining, and comparison 
areas.  The analyses reported that the DMI intervention was associated with a 
statistically significant 28.4 percent reduction in property offenses, a statistically 
significant 55.5 percent reduction in illegal drug possession offenses, and a 
statistically significant 36.8 percent reduction in drug equipment offenses.  The 
analyses also found that the DMI intervention was associated with non-statistically 
significant reductions in violent crime incidents and total calls for service.  The 
evaluation did not find any significant reductions in any of the key outcome 
variables in the remainder of Davidson County.  The researchers did find, however, 
statistically significant reductions in illegal drug possession offenses, drug 
equipment offenses, and total calls for service in the adjoining area.  This suggested 
that the DMI intervention was associated with a noteworthy diffusion of crime 
control benefits beyond the McFerrin Park target neighborhood. 
 
12 A “banked” case refers to a potential prosecution for narcotics sales, supported by audio and video 
evidence usually obtained through a controlled buy that is held in inactive status unless the subject of 
the prosecution continues dealing, at which point an arrest warrant is issued and prosecution proceeds 
(Kennedy, 2009). 
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13.10  DRUG MARKET INTERVENTION IN ROCKFORD, 
ILLINOIS 
Corsaro et al. (2010) evaluated the impact of a pulling levers focused deterrence 
strategy to reduce crime and disorder problems associated with an illegal drug 
market operating in the Delancey Heights neighborhood of Rockford, Illinois.  Like 
the Nashville strategy described above, this research and development study was a 
replication of the High Point, North Carolina DMI (Kennedy, 2009).  The strategy 
was implemented in May 2007 and the evaluation examined outcome data for the 
June 2006 through June 2008 time period. The evaluation measured the effects of 
the DMI intervention on two outcome variables: violent crime (the aggregated 
number of homicide, rape, kidnapping, robbery, and aggravated assault incidents) 
and nonviolent crime (the aggregate number of property, drug, and nuisance crime 
incidents). The researchers analyzed the aggregated monthly number of these 
outcome variables for the Delancey Heights neighborhood and for the remainder of 
Rockford without Delancey Heights.  
Hierarchical generalized linear growth curve regression models with a dummy 
variable to represent the implementation of the DMI strategy were used to analyze 
trends in the treatment and comparison areas.  The analyses reported that the DMI 
intervention was associated with a statistically significant 22 percent reduction in 
nonviolent offenses and a non-statistically significant reduction in violent offenses 
in the Delancey Heights target neighborhood.  The evaluation did not find any 
significant reductions in either violent offenses or nonviolent offenses in the 
remainder of Rockford.  Corsaro et al. (2010) also presented qualitative data from 
interviews with 34 adult residents from the Delancey Heights neighborhood.  The 
authors reported that the majority of the residents interviewed noted considerable 
crime and disorder improvements in their neighborhood after the DMI was 
implemented. 
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14 Appendix D: List of Effect Sizes 
for All Outcomes for Eligible 
Studies 
Study Outcome Effect Size  
(std. diff. in means) 
Std. Error 
Boston, MA Gun assaults 0.439 0.238 
Boston, MA Shots fired calls 0.365 0.237 
Boston, MA Youth gun assaults 0.617 0.240 
Boston, MA Youth homicides 1.161 0.251 
Chicago, IL Agg. Batteries 0.140 0.061 
Chicago, IL Gang homicides 0.089 0.061 
Chicago, IL Gun homicides 0.256 0.061 
Chicago, IL Homicides 0.237 0.061 
Chicago, IL New arrest 0.434 0.050 
Cincinnati, OH GMI homicides 0.352 0.224 
Cincinnati, OH Total shootings 0.468 0.225 
Honolulu, HI New arrest 0.666 0.115 
Indianapolis, IN Total homicides 1.039 0.283 
Los Angeles, CA Gang crimes 0.165 0.292 
Los Angeles, CA Gun crimes 0.275 0.355 
Los Angeles, CA Violent crimes 1.255 0.399 
Lowell, MA Gun assaults 1.186 0.207 
Nashville, TN Calls for service 0.520 0.311 
Nashville, TN Drug equip. offenses 0.832 0.318 
Nashville, TN Narcotics offenses 1.512 0.341 
Nashville, TN Property incidents 0.850 0.318 
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Study Outcome Effect Size  
(std. diff. in means) 
Std. Error 
Nashville, TN Violent incidents 0.476 0.310 
Newark, NJ Gunshot wounds 0.225 0.160 
Rockford, IL Non-violent offenses 0.882 0.291 
Rockford, IL Violent offenses 0.160 0.278 
Stockton, CA Gun homicides 0.763 0.157 
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15 Appendix E: Discussion of 
Hawaii Opportunity with 
Probation Enforcement 
Hawaii Opportunity with Probation Enforcement (HOPE) intervention was a 
community supervision program aimed at substance-abusing probationers (Hawken 
and Kleiman, 2009).  The program relied on a mandate to abstain from illicit drugs, 
backed by swift and certain sanctions for drug test failures, and preceded by a clear 
and direct warning.  Probationers were sentenced to drug treatment only if they 
continued to test positive for drug use, or if they requested a treatment referral.  The 
deterrence-based HOPE intervention differs significantly from typical drug court 
operations as it economizes on treatment and court resources. As Hawken and 
Kleiman (2009) suggest, HOPE does not mandate formal treatment for every 
probationer, and does not require regularly scheduled meetings with a judge; 
probationers appear before a judge only when they have violated a rule. HOPE is 
often linked to the DMI approaches as a related application of focused deterrence 
(see, e.g., Boyum, Caulkins, and Kleiman, 2011) as well as gang and group-based 
pulling levers focused deterrence based on the common strategy of certain 
punishment for offenders (Durlauf and Nagin, 2011). 
The HOPE evaluation used a randomized controlled trial among general-population 
substance-abusing probationers where probationers assigned to treatment 
conditions were compared to probationers assigned to probation-as-usual control 
conditions (Hawken and Kleiman, 2009). In their unpublished report to the U.S. 
National Institute of Justice, Hawken and Kleiman (2009) state that that HOPE 
relies on a mandate to abstain from illicit drugs, backed by swift and certain 
sanctions and preceded by a clear and direct warning. Unlike most diversion 
programs and drug courts, it does not attempt to impose drug treatment on every 
participant. Under HOPE, probationers are sentenced to drug treatment only if they 
continue to test positive for drug use, or if they request a treatment referral. 
According to Hawken and Kleiman (2009), HOPE should be considered to be 
distinct from drug courts in economizing on treatment and court resources 
(probationers appear before a judge only when a violation is detected). HOPE’s 
stated goals are reductions in drug use, new crimes, and incarceration.    
The randomized controlled trial used an intent-to-treat design where all offenders 
randomly allocated to the treatment condition were included in the HOPE group 
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whether they formally entered the program or not. Of the eligible probationers, two 
thirds were assigned to the HOPE treatment (n = 330) and one third were assigned 
to the control group (n = 163).  Ninety-three percent of the probationers assigned for 
treatment appeared for their initial HOPE warning hearing and participated in the 
intervention.  The experiment commenced in October 2007 and the intervention 
period lasted for one year.  
Based on their analyses of the experimental data, Hawken and Kleiman (2009) 
concluded that HOPE was very effective in changing the behaviors of substance-
abusing probationers.  Only 21 percent of HOPE probationers experienced new 
arrests as compared to 47 percent of control probationers (p<01).  HOPE 
probationers outperformed control probationers on a number of other performance 
measures such as missed probation appointments (treatment = 9%, control = 23%), 
positive urine drug test results (treatment = 13%, control = 46%), revocation rates 
(treatment = 7%, control = 15%), and the number of days sentenced to incarceration 
(treatment = 138 days, control = 267 days). 
Based on our selection criteria, HOPE was not included in our final review.  
However, as stated earlier, several scholars believed that HOPE does fit within the 
general framework of pulling levers focused deterrence strategies.  We agree that it 
is broadly similar to another evaluation included in our systematic review that is 
focused on a corrections population - Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods 
intervention (Papachristos et al., 2007).  The key elements of Chicago PSN strategy 
are administered by the Illinois Department of Correction and the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office (the call-in session is given to returning parolees to selected neighborhoods).  
The contribution of the Chicago Police Department is limited to increasing their gun 
policing efforts in the selected neighborhoods. The CPD does not select the returning 
parolees for the intervention nor do they run the communications strategy.  Their 
only role is to increase gun recoveries and arrest those who commit violent crimes in 
these neighborhoods. 
Moreover, probation has a central role in all of the gang / group-based focused 
deterrence interventions included in our review.  Monitoring offenders in the 
community to ensure they are abiding by probation conditions, changing conditions, 
and revoking probation are key levers that are pulled in the application of focused 
deterrence strategies to gangs and criminally-active groups.  In interagency working 
group settings, all involved agencies govern the shape and content of the pulling 
levers interventions.  While the police convene the working group meeting, they 
share governance with the other criminal justice agencies, social service providers, 
and community members in the group. Probation is involved as a key decision 
maker in the process. 
Most applications of pulling levers focused deterrence strategies have therapeutic 
elements (e.g. Braga et al., 2001; Papachristos et al., 2007).  Indeed, the working 
group has social service providers, street outreach workers, and community 
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members as core members.  A vital part of the communications strategy to pair 
threats of sanctions with offers of help (job training / placement, education, 
substance abuse counseling, etc.).  All targeted gangs and groups are offered services 
throughout the entire process.  Under HOPE, probationers are sentenced to drug 
treatment only if they continue to test positive for drug use, or if they request a 
treatment referral. HOPE is distinct from drug courts in economizing on treatment 
and court resources (probationers appear before a judge only when a violation is 
detected). 
If HOPE is included in our review, the substantive findings do not change (see Braga 
and Weisburd, 2012).  Our narrative review of program effects would change to 
report that there were 10 out of 11 eligible evaluations with positive findings (two-
tailed p = 0.0117). Our main meta-analysis of the effects of pulling levers focused 
deterrence strategies would still be limited to the ten studies that evaluated the 
impact of these interventions on crime outcomes at the area-level.  As described by 
Lipsey and Wilson (2001), it is problematic to combine effect sizes from studies with 
very different units of analysis (such as combining studies focused on people with 
studies focused on places). We can, however, separately calculate and examine effect 
sizes for the HOPE intervention’s impact on recidivism by individual probationers 
and the Chicago PSN intervention’s impact on recidivism by individual recently-
released prison inmates. 
As already described in our systematic review, the Chicago PSN quasi-experimental 
evaluation conducted additional analyses of the effects of the intervention on 
individual recidivism patterns.  The HOPE randomized controlled experiment also 
examined the effects of the treatment on individual recidivism patterns in Honolulu.  
Both studies measured recidivism as a new arrest by treatment and control 
individuals.  The HOPE effect size was calculated by using the raw data from 
Hawken and Kleiman (2009: 63-64) to construct a two by two table and entering the 
cell counts in the Effect Size Calculator.  The more conservative Logit method was 
used to calculate the effect size. We calculated effect sizes for the Chicago (.434, SE = 
.050, p < .05) and Honolulu (.666, SE = .115, p < .05) studies.  When the effect sizes 
for these studies were combined via a fixed effects meta-analysis model (Q = 3.391, 
df = 1, p = 0.066), the overall effect size was medium and statistically significant 
(.471, SE = .046, p < .05), suggesting a program impact similar to area-level impacts 
generated by the DMI and gang / group interventions. 
 
